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ABSTRACT 
 
The concept of employment is an important legal category, not 
only for labor and employment law, but also for intellectual 
property law, torts, criminal law, and tax.  The right-to-control test 
has dominated the debate over the definition of “employee” since 
its origins in the master-servant doctrine.  However, the test no 
longer represents our modern notion of what it means to be an 
employee.  This change has played itself out in research on the 
theory of the firm, which has shifted from a model of control to a 
model of participation in a team production process.  This Article 
uses the theory of the firm literature to provide a new doctrinal 
definition for “employee” based on the concept of participation 
rather than control.  The participation test better delineates the 
boundaries of employment and provides a framework for 
addressing the stresses on firms and workers that are rife within 
the modern economy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of employment plays an important role in various areas of the 
law.  Most obviously, labor and employment law protections found in local, state, 
and federal law are limited to those contracting parties that are defined as 
employees.1  However, many other areas of law draw distinctions based on the 
fact that the actor was an employee, or that the actions were taken within the 
scope of employment.  Legal doctrines in intellectual property,2 criminal law,3 tort 
law,4 and tax5 use the concept of employment in assigning rights and liabilities.  
In these situations, the law is not regulating the employment relationship directly, 
but rather adapting certain rules and regulations based on that relationship. 
                                                           
1
 See, e.g., Marc Linder, What Is an Employee?  Why It Does, But Should Not Matter, 7 LAW & 
INEQ. 155, 157-58 (1989) (“The variety of benefits and protections conditioned on the existence of 
an employment relationship is impressive: unemployment compensation, workers compensation, 
collective bargaining rights, minimum wages and maximum hours, social security, pensions, 
occupational safety and health, and anti-discrimination protection.”).  
2
 The “work for hire” doctrine is the most prominent.  See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006).  For further 
discussion, see Part I.D. 
3
 The doctrine of “enterprise liability” renders an organization liable for the crimes of its 
employees.  See infra Part I.C. 
4
 Employers have long been liable for the torts of their employees committed within the scope of 
employment under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See infra Part I.B. 
5
 Employees are treated differently within tax for a variety of purposes, including withholding, 
benefit plans, and social security payroll taxes.  See infra Part I.E. 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2252725
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Because the same concept of “employment” is used across legal contexts, 
one’s intuition is that the concept would remain largely consistent.  And this has 
largely been true.  The concept of control has served as the unifying idea behind 
the use of “employee” and “employment in various contexts.6  The common law 
“control test” comes out of the original conceptions of master and servant from 
pre-industrial English law, and the Supreme Court has used this test to define the 
term “employee” in a number of federal statutory contexts.7  However, the control 
test is not the unanimous answer; in fact, it may be losing its firm grip on the 
category.  Courts have long used the “economic realities” test in interpreting the 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).8  In addition, the D.C. Circuit recently installed 
an “entrepreneurial opportunities” test that has received support from the 
Restatement of Employment Law. 9   Foreign jurisdictions have looked to the 
concept of “economic dependence.”10   Other jurists and scholars have argued that 
there should not be any one definition of employment, and that instead the term 
should be adapted to fit the needs of the particular statutory, regulatory, or 
common law regime.11 
                                                           
6
 It should also be noted that the definition of “employment” is limited to those relationships that 
courts have deemed to be “economic” or “market-oriented” in character.  For example, prison 
labor, work within families, and student labor has been determined not to count as employment 
because it does not take place within the labor market.  As Noah Zatz has pointed out, 
“employment law systematically faces disputes over both how to draw a market/nonmarket 
distinction and whether that distinction matters legally.”  Noah D. Zatz, Working at the 
Boundaries of the Markets: Prison Labor and the Economic Dimension of Employment 
Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 862 (2008).  This article addresses the issue of whether 
work that is considered “economic” is conducted within or outside of an employment relationship. 
7
 See Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003) (interpreting 
employee under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (interpreting the definition of “employee” under ERISA); 
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (interpreting the scope of the 
work-for-hire doctrine). 
8
 See, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987) (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 
203(d), (e)(1), and (g) (2006)). 
9
 FedEx Home Delivery v. N.L.R.B., 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (arguing that the Board 
and the circuit had “shifted the emphasis away from the unwieldy control inquiry in favor of a 
more accurate proxy: whether the putative independent contractors have significant 
entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss” (internal quotations omitted)); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2 (revised), 2009), at: 
http://www.ali.org/00021333/Employment%20Law%20TD%20No%202%20-%20Revised%20-
%20September%202009.pdf. 
10
 See Guy Davidov, Who is a Worker?, 34 INDUS. L.J. 57, 59-60 (2005) (discussing the use of the 
concept of “dependence” in British law). 
11
 See, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1543-45 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., 
concurring) (suggesting that the economic realities test be exchanged for a test as to the statute’s 
purpose); Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552-53 (2d Cir. 1914) (“It is true that 
the statute uses the word ‘employed,‘ but it must be understood with reference to the purpose of 
the act, and where all the conditions of the relation require protection, protection ought to be 
given.”); Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and 
How it Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 356 (2001) (arguing that the 
concept of employment should be disregarded and other proxies for coverage should take its 
place).   
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This Article argues that there is a consistent meaning to the idea of 
employment, but it comes not from employees but rather from the firm that 
employs them.  Ever since Ronald Coase’s The Nature of the Firm,12 economists 
and legal scholars have puzzled over why the law created firms that stand outside 
the market.  The purpose of firms, Coase famously answered, is to avoid 
transaction costs by allowing the parties to organize in a hierarchical manner 
without the need for prices or specific contracts.13  As Coase put it: “If a workman 
moves from department Y to department X, he does not go because of a change in 
relative prices, but because he was ordered to do so.”14  Less well known is that 
Coase then looked to the legal definition of employee to determine whether his 
transaction-costs theory was supported in practice.15  He found that it was.  Since 
the “control” test was based on the employer’s ability to require its employees to 
take specific actions, he concluded, “[w]e thus see that it is the fact of direction 
which is the essence of the legal concept of ‘employer and employee,’ just as it 
was in the economic concept which was developed above.”16 
Coase’s approach to the theory of the firm was only the beginning.  In 
fact, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz famously rejected Coase’s workman 
example.17  Scholars have continued to place importance on the role of employees 
within the firm in defining what a firm is and why it has independent existence.  
This rich literature, however, has been largely ignored when it comes to defining 
the concept of employment.18   This article seeks to correct that failing.  The 
theory of the firm contains a critical insight: the idea of employment is based not 
on our notions of employees, but rather on our notions of employers.  There can 
                                                           
12
 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
13
 Id. at 386-87. 
14
 Id. at 387. 
15
 “We can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in practice by considering the 
legal relationship normally called that of ‘master and servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’” Id. at 
403. 
16
 Id. at 404. 
17
 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 777 (1972) (“Telling an employee to type this letter rather 
than to file that document is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna rather than that 
brand of bread.  I have no contract to continue to purchase from the grocer and neither the 
employer nor the employee is bound by any contractual obligations to continue the relationship.”).  
18
 A notable exception is Guy Davidov, who has discussed the concept of joint production and 
incomplete contracts in developing a theory of employment.  Guy Davidov, The Three Axes of 
Employment Relationships: A Characterization of Workers in Need of Protection, 52 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 357, 377-87 & nn.79, 101-117 (2002).  Tim Glynn has discussed how Coase’s work on the 
firm explains the shift to smaller firms and enterprise disaggregation.  Glynn argued that the rise in 
transaction costs from legal regulations such as labor and employment laws led many employers 
to outsource the employment relationship onto fly-by-night subcontractors, who often dissolve or 
disappear when faced with litigation.  Timothy P. Glynn, Taking the Employer Out of Employment 
Law?  Accountability for Wage and Hour Violations in an Age of Enterprise Disaggregation, 15 
EMP. RIGHTS AND EMP. POL’Y J. 201, 206-15 (2011).  Scott Masten examined the definition of 
employment in assessing the legal significance of the firm in practice.  See Scott E. Masten,, A 
Legal Basis for the Firm, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND DEVELOPMENT 
196 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1993).  I endeavor to do the converse: 
examine the theory of the firm literature in assessing the definition of employment. 
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be no employee without an employer.19  And the converse is also true – there is 
no employer without employees. The theory of the firm literature demonstrates 
that the employer is a firm, and that the concept of employment is critical in 
determining what the firm is and why it continues to exist. 
Close examination of the boundaries between employee and independent 
contractor may appear at first to be a tedious and inconsequential exercise.  But its 
theoretical and practical implications are massive.  The popularity of the 
employment relationship has seen significant erosion, as more companies seek to 
outsource their chain of production and more workers enjoy only temporary 
employment.20  At the same time, nationwide firms are placing greater importance 
on their economic brands, and employees are critical representatives of their 
companies when it comes to the value and influence of the brand.21  We grow 
closer to a potential “death of employment”22 at the same time that multinational 
corporations have more economic power than ever.  These pressures ask us to 
consider what, if anything, about the concept of “employment” is worth saving, 
and if so, how best to save it.  We need to identify our theory of employment law 
in order to justify our understanding of it and the purpose of the category in the 
first place. 
Using the theory of the firm literature, the Article argues that the proper 
definition of employee is not the control test, the economic realities test, or the 
entrepreneurial opportunities test.  Instead, it argues that the concept of 
employment is generally used to differentiate between members and nonmembers 
of an economic firm.  In other words, employees are participants in a common 
economic enterprise organized into a business entity.  This definition provides the 
best rationale for the use of the “employee” category in areas of law such as 
intellectual property, tax, and torts.  Moreover, the participation theory explains 
while labor and employment law protections are based on employment: these 
protections are designed to make the firm more responsible for its participants.  
Because employees participate in the common economic enterprise as organized 
into a firm, the firm in turn must take care of its employees within that common 
enterprise. 
The purpose of this article seeks to establish a new definition of 
employment within the law based on participation, rather than control.  Part I of 
the Article discusses where (and why) the concepts of “employee” and 
“employment” are used within the law.  Part II sets out the various doctrinal 
definitions of the terms “employee” and “scope of employment,” and also 
examines the theories behind these definitions.  Part III provides an overview the 
theory of the firm literature and the role of employees within that literature.  Part 
                                                           
19
 In fact, the standard statutory definition of “employee” is the following exercise in passive 
voice: “one who is employed by an employer.”  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2006).  
20
 See, e.g., Peter Coy, Michelle Conlin & Moira Herbst , The Disposable Worker, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 28, 2010, at 33 (discussing trends of temporary employment in the wake of 
the financial crisis). 
21
 Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying Into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1179 
(2010). 
22
 Alan Hyde, Employment Law After the Death of Employment, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 99, 99 
(1998). 
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IV uses the theory of the firm to develop a new definition of employment within 
the law based on participation.  Finally, Part V briefly considers the future of the 
concept of “employment” in the law. 
 
 
I. THE CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE LAW 
 
The terms “employee” and “employment” are used within the law for a 
variety of purposes.   This Part examines the role that the employment-related 
categories serve in the various subject areas. 
 
A. Labor and Employment Law 
 
Lawmakers have used the concept of employment to create a set of rights 
within the law that provide additional protections to those considered employees.  
The statutes that comprise federal labor and employment law all have provisions 
that are limited to those who serve as employees.  Thus, critical protections 
against race, sex, age, and disability discrimination,23 below-minimum wages,24 
dangerous working conditions,25 retirement funding requirements,26 and threats 
against collective activity 27  are limited to employees.  State employment 
provisions such as workers compensation and unemployment compensation are 
also limited to employees.  These statutory schemes are designed to provide 
protections to employees as employees and not to any other groups, even if such 
other groups might benefit from the scheme. 
Along with using employment to define vicarious liability (discussed 
below in Part B), the common law also has certain doctrines that are limited to 
employment.  The tort of wrongful discharge, for example, provides rights to an 
                                                           
23
 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment action for an employer 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or (2) to limit, segregate, 
or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to 
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an 
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”); 29 U.S.C. § 
623 (2006) (providing similar protections against age discrimination within the employment 
relationship); 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006) (providing similar protections against disability 
discrimination).  
24
 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (2006) (providing minimum wage and overtime protections for 
employees). 
25
 See 29 U.S.C. § 654(a) (2006) (requiring employers to “furnish to each of his employees 
employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards . . .”). 
26
 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006) (providing for minimum vesting standards for employee 
retirement accounts). 
27
 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (2006) (“It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer (1) to 
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 
of this title; . . . (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or 
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . 
.”). 
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employee—not an independent contractor. 28   And employment at-will is a 
common law doctrine that is arguably separate from the traditional set of rules for 
contract interpretation.29  For these provisions to kick in, the individual must be 
an employee.  In addition, under agency law employees have a fiduciary duty of 
loyalty to their employers.30  This duty generally requires the employee not to 
compete directly with the employer while still an employee.31 
 
B. Vicarious Liability in Tort 
 
The concept of employment is used as the basic dividing line in the 
doctrine of respondeat superior.  An employer is liable for the acts of its 
employee committed within the scope of employment, but it is generally not 
liable for the acts of independent contractors that are working with it. 32  
Respondeat superior has its roots in early master-servant doctrine, in which a 
master was liable for harms caused by the actions of his servant.33  The doctrine 
continues in the modern common law, with most courts using the term 
“employee” in place of “servant.”  Although many different justifications for the 
doctrine have been given, most center around the responsibility for or control of 
                                                           
28
 For a discussion of the tort of wrongful discharge, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT 
LAW § 4.01 Reporters’ Notes to cmt. a (to be reclassified as § 5.01) (Tentative Draft 2, 2009) 
(“The vast majority of jurisdictions recognize some form of the tort of employer discipline in 
violation of public policy, usually in discharge cases.”), at: 
http://www.ali.org/00021333/Employment%20Law%20TD%20No%202%20-%20Revised%20-
%20September%202009.pdf.  
29
 The employment at-will rule is a default provision in employment contracts that the relationship 
can be terminated at any time by either party.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW 
§ 2.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009).  The at-will rule may even be considered a “sticky” default – 
namely, a default rule that requires more explicit or onerous expressions of intent to overcome.  
See Deborah A. DeMott, Investing in Work: Wilkes as an Employment Law Case, 33 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 497, 498 (2011) (arguing that employment at will may be a sticky default); David 
Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform: Employment at Will 
Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 1028-30 (1998) (arguing that the default rule should 
be changed from at-will employment to a “just cause” regime because the just cause regime may 
better represent an efficient outcome between the parties). 
30
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1957); Terry A. O’Neill, Employees’ Duty of 
Loyalty and the Corporate Constituency Debate, 25 CONN. L. REV. 681, 685 (1993) (“All 
employees owe a fiduciary duty of loyalty to their employer—be the employer a sole proprietor, a 
partnership, a close corporation, or a large, publicly traded corporation.”). 
31
 Id. at 695 (“Until his employment is terminated, . . . he may not engage in actual competition 
against his employer.”).  Enhanced remedies, including disgorgement of compensation paid during 
the period of disloyalty, are available in some jurisdictions under the “faithless servant” doctrine.  
See, e.g., Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman, 914 N.E.2d 36 (Mass. 2009); Charles A. Sullivan, 
Mastering the Faithless Servant?: Reconciling Employment Law, Contract Law, and Fiduciary 
Duty, 2011 WISC. L. REV. 777, 779-80 (discussing the doctrine). 
32
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.04 (2006) (“An employer is subject to liability for torts 
committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment.”); RESTATEMENT 
SECOND OF TORTS § 409 (1965) (“Except as stated in §§ 410-429, the employer of an independent 
contractor is not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor 
or his servants.”). 
33
 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 410 (1765). 
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the employer over the employee.34  Because the tort was committed within the 
scope of employment, the employing entity is also liable for the injury along with 
the employee.  Employers can also be liable for the torts of independent 
contractors, but generally only under one of three conditions: (1) the employer is 
negligent in selecting, instructing, or supervising the contractor; (2) the employer 
has a non-delegable duty to the public as a whole or the particular plaintiff; or (3) 
the work done by the contractor for the employer is specially or inherently 
dangerous.35 Unites States common law used to follow the “fellow servant” rule, 
in which the employer was absolved of liability to an employee for an injury 
caused by a fellow employee.36  However, this rule has generally been abolished 
and/or rendered obsolete by workers compensation statutes.37 
 
C. Criminal Liability 
 
As in tort law, business organizations may be held liable under criminal 
law under the doctrine of respondeat superior.38  Corporations and other business 
entities are guilty of crimes committed by their employees if such crimes were 
committed in the scope of employment.  In order to satisfy the mens rea 
requirement, courts have additionally required that the employee have acted with 
the intent to benefit the corporation.39  Although the doctrine has faced steady 
criticism over the years, it has become “firmly entrenched as, more or less, the 
across-the-board rule of enterprise liability for all manner of crimes.”40  However, 
the de jure rule masks a more complex reality.  Courts and prosecutors have in 
practice adopted a narrower standard of liability when it comes to institutional 
guilt.  At the front end, a series of Department of Justice memos over the last 
decade chronicled the attempts to demarcate when corporations should be charged 
                                                           
34
 PAGE W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at 499–501 (5th 
ed. 1984) (emphasis added). 
35
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 cmt.b (1965).  These are the three primary 
circumstances; the employer is also liable when it has performed a contract using independent 
contractors when those services were accepted in the belief that they were to be performed by the 
employer and its employees.  Id. § 429. 
36
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 474 (1957) (“A master is not liable to a servant or 
subservant who, while acting within the scope of his employment or in connection therewith, is 
injured solely by the negligence of a fellow servant in the performance of acts not involving a 
violation of the master's non-delegable duties, unless the servant was coerced or deceived into 
serving, was too young to appreciate the risks, or was employed in violation of statute.”). 
37
 KEETON ET AL., supra note PK1984, at 575-76; J.M. Balkin, Too Good to Be True: The Positive 
Economic Theory of Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1447, 1486-87 (1987) ("[T]he fellow servant rule is 
like a mastodon preserved in a glacier—it was rendered obsolete by workers' compensation, and, 
given the general trend of twentieth century tort law, there can be no question that if workers' 
compensation were abolished today few courts would follow the fellow servant rule in industrial 
accident cases."). 
38
 N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909). 
39
 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 307 F2d 120, 128 (5th Cir. 1962). 
40
 Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J. 473, 475-76 
(2006).  See also Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 836 (1994) (stating that the existing legal regime closely approximates a 
rule of “pure strict vicarious liability”). 
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with crimes. 41   All of these guidelines required more than mere respondeat 
superior liability.42   At the back end, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines assessed 
punishment for corporate guilt based on whether “an individual within high-level 
personnel of the unit participated in, condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the 
offense; or tolerance of the offense by substantial authority personnel was 
pervasive throughout such [entity].”43  Commentators have noted a change from 
vicarious liability to more of a negligence standard on the part of corporate 
management in overseeing internal investigations.44   This move has had both 
supporters and critics.45  However, the overall liability rule itself remains based on 
respondeat superior. 
 
 
D. Intellectual Property 
 
The term “intellectual property” refers to a wide range of information to 
which specific legal rights have attached.  In some cases, intellectual property is 
                                                           
41
 See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney Gen. Larry Thompson to Heads of Dep't Components, 
Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Org. (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm; Memorandum from Deputy 
Attorney Gen. Paul J. McNulty to Heads of Dep't Components, Principles of Fed. Prosecution of 
Bus. Org. 4 (Dec. 12, 2006), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf; Memorandum of Deputy Attorney 
Gen. Mark R. Filip, Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Org. 4 (Aug. 28, 2008), available at 
http:// www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf. 
42
 The Thompson Memorandum listed the following factors in determining when to charge a 
corporation: (1) the nature and seriousness of the offense; the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within 
the corporation; (3) the corporation’s history of similar conduct; (4) the corporation’s cooperation 
and willingness to waiver attorney-client privilege and work product protection; (5) the existence 
of a compliance program; (6) the corporation’s remedial actions; (7) collateral consequences of a 
charge, such as harm to shareholders, pension holders, and employees; (8) the adequacy of 
prosecuting the individuals involved; and (9) the adequacy of civil or regulatory enforcement.  
Thompson Memorandum, supra note TM2003. Factor 4 became quite controversial, as courts 
became concerned that the federal government was pressuring corporate leaders into giving up 
attorney-client protections for their employees in order to spare a corporate criminal charge.  See, 
e.g., Unites States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding that “the government 
deprived [employee] defendants of their right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment by causing 
KPMG to impose conditions on the advancement of legal fees to defendants, to cap the fees, and 
ultimately to end payment”). 
43
 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8c2.5g (2004). 
44
 See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent 
Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 572 (2005) ("[A]t least since the adoption of the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines (OSG) in 1991, the U.S. legal regime has been moving 
away from a system of strict vicarious liability toward a system of duty-based organizational 
liability."). 
45
 For support for a deterrence-based approach, see Vikramiditya S. Khanna, Should the Behavior 
of Top Management Matter?, 91 GEO. L.J. 1215, 1224 (2003) ("Corporate liability improves 
deterrence when agents are judgment-proof because it places corporate assets at risk and thereby 
forces the corporation to internalize the social costs of wrongdoing."). For criticism of the 
monitoring-based approach, see Krawiec, supra note KK1, at 614 (2005) ("I conclude that the 
U.S. legal regime's move away from strict vicarious liability to internal compliance-based liability 
is unjustified by either theory or empirical evidence."). 
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generated by a single individual: an author writing alone in her home, or an 
inventor toiling away in the garage.  However, in many cases, intellectual 
property is generated by specific individuals who are working within the context 
of a larger firm.  How the rights to that “property” are divvied up have significant 
legal and economic ramifications, particularly for firms and individual 
employees.46 
Federal law establishes ownership rights for copyrighted works.  The 
“work-for-hire” doctrine was originally established in the 1909 Copyright Act, as 
that act specified that the author of a copyrighted work “shall include an employer 
in the case of works made for hire.”47  The Copyright Act of 1976 continued this 
doctrine, specifying that the employer is considered the author of any work made 
for hire unless expressly agreed otherwise.48  The 1976 Act defines “work made 
for hire” as “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her 
employment.”49  The Act does not further define employee or employment. 
The default rule for patent law is that the employee who invents the patent 
is the author, not the employer.50  However, the employer is free to contract with 
employees explicitly for the rights to all inventions created within the scope of 
employment.  Even without an explicit contract, courts have found something 
akin to a work for hire doctrine when an employee is hired to work on a specific 
invention or problem; courts are more likely to conclude that “the employee was 
hired to invent and therefore the firm owned all patents” through contract.51   In 
addition, under the shop-right doctrine, employers enjoy a non-exclusive right to 
use the patent without having to compensate the employee.  A shop right arises 
when the employee has created the invention on the job using the employer’s 
materials. 52   If the employee creates the invention at work while using the 
employer’s tools, the employer has a right to use that invention without cost. 
Trademark presents a special connection between the firm, its employees, 
and intellectual property.  Trademark protection is what enables a group of people 
to join together and be recognized as a common enterprise without fearing that 
their reputation will be poached by outsiders.  Just as patent and copyright 
                                                           
46
 See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE 
CHANGING WORKPLACE 127-29 (2004) (discussing disputes over ownership of human capital). 
47
 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, §23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (repealed 1976). 
48
 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006) (“In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person 
for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the 
parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the 
rights comprised in the copyright.”) 
49
 Id. § 101. 
50
 The patent must be registered by the individual inventor.  See 35 U.S.C. § 111, 115 (2006) 
(discussing oath taken as part of patent process that the registrant is the “original and first 
inventor”).  
51
 CATHERINE L. FISK, WORKING KNOWLEDGE: EMPLOYEE INNOVATION AND THE RISE OF 
CORPORATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1800-1930 180 (2009).  See also Dan L. Burk, Intellectual 
Property and the Firm, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 15 (2004) (“In the absence of explicit contractual 
terms requiring an assignment, an implied duty to assign may be found.  Courts have tended to 
recognize such an implied duty to assign patent rights in situations where an employee hired to 
solve a problem engages in research, and the invention relates to that effort.”). 
52
 FISK, supra note CF2009, at 118; Burk, supra note DB2004, at 16. 
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protections concern the allocation of information rights between employee and 
firm, trademark concerns the allocation of good will and reputational rights 
between employee and firm.53 Trademarks enable firms to transfer reputational 
assets over to the firm, and thus deprive individual employees of their ability to 
hold up the firm over their own reputational assets.54 
Finally, the prohibition against the disclosure of trade secrets is not limited 
to employees.  The Uniform Trade Secret Act defines misappropriation of a trade 
secret as acquiring the trade secret either by improper means or “under 
circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use.”55  The 
Act covers any “person,” defined as “a natural person, corporation, business trust, 
estate, trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental 
subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity.”56   However, 
employees are expected to keep confidential any of the employer’s trade secrets to 
which they are exposed during the course of employment.57  Indeed, employees 
are primary targets for the protections against trade secret misappropriation. A 
study of trade secret litigation found that 85% of trade secret cases involved either 
current or former employees or business partners.58   Employees are generally 
presumed to have an implied duty to keep any trade secrets to which they are 
exposed confidential.59  Moreover, the doctrine of “inevitable disclosure of trade 
secrets” has applied in some jurisdictions to employees who leave the company 
but (according to the court) must inevitably use the trade secrets they have learned 
at their old position.60 
 
                                                           
53
 Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, Trademarks and the Boundaries of the Firm, 51 WILLIAM 
& MARY L. REV.  345, 363-64 (2009). 
54
 Id. at 376-79. 
55
 UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 529 (2005) [hereinafter 
UTSA].  The Act is model civil legislation that has been adopted at least in part by forty-seven 
jurisdictions.  14 U.L.A. 71-72 (Supp. 2011). 
56
 UTSA, supra note UTSA, § 1(3). 
57
 O’Neill, supra note TON1993, at 695 n.65 (“Courts have held that when an employer discloses 
its trade secret to an employee during the course of employment, the employee is bound by his 
fiduciary duty of loyalty not to use or reveal it for his own personal benefit.”). 
58
 David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 
GONZ. L. REV. 291, 294 (2010). The study also found that trade secret owners were "twice as 
likely to prevail on a motion for preliminary relief when they sued employees as when they sued 
business partners." Id. However, owners were also "over 70% more likely to lose a motion to 
dismiss when they sued employees than business partners." Id. 
59
 See Unistar Corporation v. Child, 415 So.2d 733, 734 (Fla. 3d Ct. App. 1982) (“The law will 
import into every contract of employment a prohibition against the use of a trade secret by the 
employee for his own benefit, to the detriment of his employer, if the secret was acquired by the 
employee in the course of his employment.”); Derek P. Martin, Comment, An Employer’s Guide 
to Protecting Trade Secrets from Employee Misappropriation, 1993 BYU L. REV. 949, 953 (“For 
most employees the law presumes a confidential relationship between employer and employee for 
the purposes of protecting trade secrets.”). 
60
 See, e.g., PepsiCo v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995); Rebecca J. Berkun, The Dangers 
of the Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure in Pennsylvania, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 157, 157 
(2003) (“The doctrine of inevitable disclosure restricts an employee's future employment if that 
employee will inevitably use a former employer's trade secrets in the course of the future 
employment.”). 
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E. Tax 
 
Firms are expected to differentiate between employees and independent 
contractors over a host of provisions, including whether taxes need to be 
withheld,61 whether the firm must pay a share of Social Security and Medicare 
(FICA)62  and unemployment (FUTA) taxes63  for the worker, and whether the 
workers count as employees for benefit plan purposes. 64   The IRS defines 
employees based on the common law control test.65   The consequences of a 
misclassification can be extremely costly, as the business is then subject to the 
mandatory back-tax formula.66  In fact, Congress was moved to create a ‘safe 
harbor’ for employers when it came to the employee-independent contractor 
distinction. 67   The upshot of these requirements is to give the firm tax 
responsibilities for its employees, while giving independent contractors tax 
responsibilities for themselves. We thus see the differentiation between employee 
and independent contractor: the firm is expected to manage and even pay some 
taxes for its employees, while it must leave independent contractors to their own 
devices. 
 
 
II. THE DEFINITION OF EMPLOYMENT IN DOCTRINE AND THEORY 
 
The categories of “employee” and “the scope of employment” define 
certain contours within various areas of the law.  For many statutory schemes, the 
“employee” category does all of the work; once the identity of the person as an 
employee has been established, that person has the rights conveyed upon 
employees and can bring claims for violations of those rights.  In other areas of 
the law, however, the person and the context are relevant to establishing the legal 
category; therefore, both “employee” and “scope of employment” are necessary to 
establish.  Both categories are considered below. 
 
A. Defining“Employee” 
 
                                                           
61
 26 U.S.C. § 3402 (2006). 
62
 26 U.S.C. § 3101 et seq. (2006). 
63
 26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq. (2006). 
64
 26 U.S.C. § 410 (2006). 
65
 See 26 U.S.C. § 3121(d)(2) (2006) (defining an employee as, among other definitions, “any 
individual who, under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the employer-
employee relationship, has the status of an employee”); TREAS. REGS. § 31.3121(d)-1(c) (2012) 
(finding an employment relationship “when the person for whom services are performed has the 
right to control and direct the individual who performs the services, not only as to the result to be 
accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that result is 
accomplished”).  See also 26 U.S.C. § 3306(i) (2006) (stating that “the term ‘employee’ has the 
meaning assigned to such term by section 3121(d)”); REV. RUL. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296. 
66
 26 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006). 
67
 REVENUE ACT OF 1978, § 530. 
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1. The Common Law “Control” Test. — The “control” test is the 
dominant standard for employment, both nationally and internationally.68  The test 
finds its historical roots in the definition of “servant” in English common law.  
William Blackstone describes the relationship between master and servant as one 
of the three “great relations in private life,” along with husband and wife and 
parent and child. 69   The relationship was used primarily not for contractual 
purposes, but rather to establish the duties each owed to the other, and to establish 
when a master was liable for the actions of the servant.  The master was certainly 
liable if the servant committed the act “by the command or encouragement of the 
master,” but liability extended beyond such direct orders.  Blackstone offered the 
following example, and justification: “If an innkeeper’s servants rob his guests, 
the master is bound to restitution; for as there is a confidence reposed in him, that 
he will take care to provide honest servants, his negligence is a kind of implied 
consent to the robbery.”70 
Under what circumstances would one who contracts for labor be liable for 
the acts of the laborer?  The law does not render principals liable for the acts of 
their agents taken outside of the agent’s authority.71  Such vicarious liability is 
reserved for the master-servant relationship.  English courts based the definition 
of this relationship on the notion of control.  The basics of the control test are 
straightforward.  A servant is one who is “under the duty of rendering personal 
services to the master or to others on behalf of the master.”72  In addition, the 
master must have the “right to control the servant’s work,” which means “being 
entitled to tell the servant when to work (within the hours of service) and when 
not to work, and what work to do and how to do it.”73  This right of control is 
what separates master-servant from the principal-agent. 
The Restatement Second of Agency is perhaps the most widely-
recognized source in American law for the principal-agent and master-servant 
                                                           
68
 Davidov, supra note GD2002, at 367 (“Control/subordination is still the leading (and sometimes 
the single) characteristic of employment relationships in many countries.”). 
69
 BLACKSTONE, supra note WB1765, at 410. 
70
 Id. See also WILLIAM PALEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, CHIEFLY 
WITH REFERENCE TO MERCANTILE TRANSACTIONS 126 (3d ed. 1840) (“A master is responsible for 
the negligence or unskillfulness of a servant acting in the prosecution of his service, though not 
under his immediate direction.”).  But cf. Harold J. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 
YALE L.J. 105, 105-06 (1916) (describing the doctrine of respondeat superior liability for the 
unauthorized actions of a servant as “novel” and concealing “a veritable hornets’ nest of stinging 
difficulties”).  
71
 An agent can operate on behalf of the principal and can bind the principal by his or her actions.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006).  An agent can act for the principal even when 
authority has not been expressly granted, as long as a third party reasonably believes the agent has 
the authority.  Id. § 2.03.  However, respondeat superior does not extend to principals’ liability for 
the actions of agents.  As the Restatement explains: “Agents who are retained as the need arises 
and who are not otherwise employees of their principal normally operate their own business 
enterprises and are not, except in limited respects, integrated into the principal's enterprise so that 
a task may be completed or a specified objective accomplished. Therefore, respondeat superior 
does not apply.”  Id. § 2.04 cmt. b. 
72
 FRANCIS R. BATT, THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 6 (1929), quoted in Coase, supra note 
RC1, at 403-04. 
73
 Id. at 404. 
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doctrines.74  Section 220 provides the following definition: “A servant is a person 
employed to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the 
physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's 
control or right to control.”75  As the commentary acknowledges, however, this 
relationship is “one not capable of exact definition.”76  The Restatement provides 
a ten-factor test to further determine whether the potential employer is exercising 
control: 
 
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may 
exercise over the details of the work; 
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business; 
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the 
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the 
employer or by a specialist without supervision; 
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the 
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing 
the work; 
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed; 
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the 
employer; 
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation 
of master and servant; and 
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.77 
 
The Restatement Third of Agency has adapted the language of these doctrines by 
changing “servant” to “employee,” 78  but the doctrines remain relatively the 
same.79 
Master-servant doctrine makes no exceptions or differentiations based on 
the relative status of the “servant” vis-à-vis the master.  It may seem that high-
ranking employees would not meet the test, as their actions are not controlled in 
                                                           
74
 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS & LLCS 19 (2004) (“In general, the single 
most influential source of legal rules in this area remains the American law Institute’s Restatement 
of Agency.”). 
75
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1957). 
76
 Id. § 220 cmt. c. 
77
 Id. § 220(2).  These factors have significant overlap with the criteria to determine “conditions of 
dependency or subordination” included in a set of International Labor Organization (ILO) draft 
recommendations.  See Davidov, supra GD2002, at 402. 
78
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §7.07(3)(a) (2006) (“ . . .[A]n employee is an agent 
whose principal controls or has the right to control the manner and means of the agent's 
performance of work . . . .”). 
79
 The primary difference in language, beyond the change from servant to employee, is the 
removal of “physical” as a modifier for control.  Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 
220 (1957), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §7.07(3)(a) (2006).  The Restatement Third 
also moves the ten-factor test into the comments section.  Id. §7.07 cmt. f. 
PARTICIPATION AS THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT                          15 
 
 
 
the same way as rank-and-file workers.  However, no such exception exists.  
Instead, control “indicates the closeness of the relation between the one giving 
and the one receiving the service rather than the nature of the service or the 
importance of the one giving it. Thus, ship captains and managers of great 
corporations are normally superior servants, differing only in the dignity and 
importance of their positions from those working under them.” 80   The 
Restatement Third uses the same example but frames the justification a bit 
differently: “In some employment relationships, an employer's right of control 
may be attenuated. For example, senior corporate officers, like captains of ships, 
may exercise great discretion in operating the enterprises entrusted to them, just 
as skilled professionals exercise discretion in performing their work. Nonetheless, 
all employers retain a right of control, however infrequently exercised.”81  The 
only differentiation is that an employer may be liable for punitive damages if the 
agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of 
employment, or the principal or a managerial agent of the principal ratified or 
approved the act.82 
The Supreme Court has made the common-law “control” test into the 
default test for “employee” whenever used without further explanation in a 
federal statute.  In Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,83 for example, 
the Court said that “[i]n the past, when Congress has used the term ‘employee’ 
without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the 
conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency 
doctrine.”84  It further found it appropriate to rely on the general common-law of 
agency, rather than the doctrine of any particular state, in order to create a 
national, uniform law of copyright.85  It thus relied on the Restatement Second of 
Agency in developing a multifactor test.  However, the thirteen-factor test used in 
CCNV to illustrate the common law test differs from the Restatement Second of 
Agency’s ten-factor test in several ways.86  The Restatement test includes these 
factors not included in the CCNV test: 
 
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business; 
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the 
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the 
employer or by a specialist without supervision; . . . [and] 
                                                           
80
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. a (1957).  
81
 See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §7.07 cmt. f (2006)  The Restatement then 
provides the example of a CEO who has bad vision but still wants to drive; the board can compel 
the CEO to use a driver when on company business, despite the CEO’s authority over the 
company.  Id. § 7.07 cmt. f ex. 15. 
82
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217C(c) & (d) (1957). 
83490 U.S. 730 (1989). 
84
 Id. at 739-740. 
85
 Id. at 740. 
86
 Id. at 751-52. 
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(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation 
of master and servant.87 
 
The CCNV test in turn includes these six factors not included in the Restatement 
test: 
 
the location of the work; . . . 
whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects 
to the hired party; 
the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long 
to work; . . . 
the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; . . . . 
the provision of employee benefits; and 
the tax treatment of the hired party.88 
 
The Court examined these factors and found the sculpture at issue in the case was 
made by an independent contractor, rather than an employee.89 
ERISA's nominal definition of “employee” is “any individual employed 
by an employer,” without any further direction.90  The Supreme Court has adopted 
the common law test as the basis for the Act’s definition.91  The Court cited to the 
definition of the common law test provided in CCNV v. Reid and quoted the 
                                                           
87
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1957). 
88
 CCNV, 490 U.S. at 751-52. 
89
 The Court concluded as follows: 
 
Examining the circumstances of this case in light of these factors, we agree with 
the Court of Appeals that Reid was not an employee of CCNV but an 
independent contractor. True, CCNV members directed enough of Reid's work 
to ensure that he produced a sculpture that met their specifications. But the 
extent of control the hiring party exercises over the details of the product is not 
dispositive. Indeed, all the other circumstances weigh heavily against finding an 
employment relationship. Reid is a sculptor, a skilled occupation. Reid supplied 
his own tools. He worked in his own studio in Baltimore, making daily 
supervision of his activities from Washington practicably impossible. Reid was 
retained for less than two months, a relatively*753 short period of time. During 
and after this time, CCNV had no right to assign additional projects to Reid. 
Apart from the deadline for completing the sculpture, Reid had absolute freedom 
to decide when and how long to work. CCNV paid Reid $15,000, a sum 
dependent on completion of a specific job, a method by which independent 
contractors are often compensated. Reid had total discretion in hiring and paying 
assistants. “Creating sculptures was hardly ‘regular business' for CCNV.” 
Indeed, CCNV is not a business at all. Finally, CCNV did not pay payroll or 
Social Security taxes, provide any employee benefits, or contribute to 
unemployment insurance or workers' compensation funds. 
 
Id. at 752-53 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
90
 29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2006).  See Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 
323 (1992) (saying the definition is “completely circular and explains nothing”). 
91
 Id.   
PARTICIPATION AS THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT                          17 
 
 
 
thirteen-factor test used in that decision. 92   While acknowledging that “the 
traditional agency law criteria offer no paradigm of determinacy,” the Court 
argued that the common-law test “generally turns on factual variables within an 
employer's knowledge” and comports “with our recent precedents and with the 
common understanding, reflected in those precedents, of the difference between 
an employee and an independent contractor.”93  The Court rejected the lower 
court’s definition, which was similar to the “economic realities” test, because it 
found that ERISA’s statutory definition was not equally expansive, as it did not 
include “suffer or permit to work.”94 
The federal employment antidiscrimination statutes – Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) – all share the same definition of 
employee as ERISA: “an individual employed by an employer.”95  Up until the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Darden, circuit courts had applied different tests to 
determine employee status.  Some applied the common law test, 96  some the 
economic realities test,97  and some a hybrid test looking at both control and 
economic realities.98  After the Court’s holding in Darden that ERISA’s definition 
should follow the common law test, circuit courts largely saw the writing on the 
wall and applied the common-law test to antidiscrimination statutes.99  The Court 
                                                           
92
 Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 (citing CCNV, 490 U.S. at 751-752).  The relevant quotation provided: 
 
In determining whether a hired party is an employee under the general common law of agency, we 
consider the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is 
accomplished. Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of 
the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between 
the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; 
the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; 
the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular 
business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee 
benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. 
Id.   
93
 Id. at 328. 
94
 Id. at 325-26. 
95
 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e(f) (2006) (Title VII); 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (2006) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 
12111(4) (2006) (ADA).  
96
 See, e.g., Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 339-41 (11th Cir. 1982). 
97
 See, e.g., Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1132, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983).  See Patricia Davidson, 
Comment, The Definition of “Employee” Under Title VII: Distinguishing Between Employees and 
Independent Contractors, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 203, 219-22 (1984) (discussing the Armbruster case 
at length). 
98
 See, e.g., Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985).  The hybrid test was arguably 
“the favored standard for claims under both Title VII and the ADEA” prior to the Darden 
decision.  Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond “Economic Realities”: The Case for 
Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. 
L. REV. 239, 250 (1997). 
99
 Wilde v. County of Kandiyohi, 15 F.3d 103, 105-06 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Application of the 
economic realities test results in Title VII coverage for some common-law independent contractors 
because they are vulnerable to discrimination arising in the course of their work. Because the 
economic realities test is based on the premise that the term should be construed in light of Title 
VII's purpose and the construction is broader than at common law, Darden precludes the test's 
application."); Maltby & Yamada, supra note MY1, at 253 (noting that “[t]he Darden decision has 
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confirmed this approach in Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. 
Wells. 100  In Clackamas, the court cited to Darden and held that the same 
common-law approach should apply to the federal antidiscrimination statues.101  
Thus, the common-law test has now been ensconced.102  The Court specified that 
“[w]e think that the common-law element of control is the principal guidepost that 
should be followed in this case.”103 
 The Court has also used common-law agency principles in establishing 
employer liability for acts of harassment by its employees.  In the cases of 
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth 104  and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 105 
supervisors had subjected the plaintiffs to hostile work environments, and the 
Court needed to determine whether the employer was vicariously liable for the 
actions of its supervisors.106  After a detailed examination of agency law in both 
cases, the Court unveiled the following standard: 
 
An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized 
employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a 
supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over 
                                                                                                                                                               
significantly influenced judicial interpretations under Title VII and ADEA”).  But see Frankel v. 
Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1993) (adhering to the hybrid test).  The Frankel court found 
“that in practice there is little discernible difference between the hybrid test (which pre-dates and 
is not adopted in Darden) and the common law agency test.”  Id. at 90. 
100
 538 U.S. 440 (2003). 
101
 Id. at 444-45, 447, 451. 
102
 The Clackamas decision was not an effort to distinguish employees from independent 
contractors; rather, it addressed the question of whether a shareholder of a professional corporation 
was an employee or instead an employer.  And while the Court argued that “the common law’s 
definition of the master-servant relationship does provide helpful guidance,” it tacitly 
acknowledged that the usual factors to that test were inapplicable.  Instead, it endorsed the 
EEOC’s six-factor test, purportedly based on the common law agency test: 
 
Whether the organization can hire or fire the individual or set the rules and regulations of the 
individual's work;  
Whether and, if so, to what extent the organization supervises the individual's work; 
Whether the individual reports to someone higher in the organization; 
 
Whether and, if so, to what extent the individual is able to influence the organization; 
Whether the parties intended that the individual be an employee, as expressed in written 
agreements or contracts; [and] 
Whether the individual shares in the profits, losses, and liabilities of the organization. 
 
Id. at 449-50 (citing EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 605:0009 (2000)).  This set of factors is not 
exhaustive.  Id. at 450 (“The answer to whether a shareholder-director is an employee or an 
employer cannot be decided in every case by a shorthand formula or magic phrase.”).  The 
Clackamas decision has been criticized for creating a distinction between employees and high-
level employee-managers that need not and does not exist, at least in the common law of agency.  
See Frank J. Menetrez, Employee Status and the Concept of Control in Federal Employment 
Discrimination Law , 63 SMU L. REV. 137, 182-86 (2010). 
103
 Id. at 448. 
104
 524 U.S. 742 (1998). 
105
 524 U.S. 775 (1998).  
106
 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754. 
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the employee. When no tangible employment action is taken, a 
defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or 
damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence, see 
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c). The defense comprises two necessary 
elements: (a) that the employer exercised reasonable care to 
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and 
(b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take 
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided 
by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.107 
 
The standard provides a twist on respondeat superior liability, in that it makes the 
corporation liable for actions such as sexual harassment that traditionally were not 
held to be within the scope of employment.108  However, acknowledging that the 
supervisor is aided in the agency relation through her or his power over the 
employee,109 the Court assigns liability to the business entity unless the entity 
provided a reasonable method of correcting the problem and the employee 
unreasonably failed to utilize it.110 
OSHA offers its statutory protections to “employee[s] of an employer who 
is employed in a business of his employer which affects commerce.”111  Given the 
similarities between this definition and the definition used in ERISA and the 
antidiscrimination statutes, it seems almost indisputable that the common-law 
agency test would apply.  This has been the administrative conclusion. 112  
However, at least one court continued to apply the “economic realities” test post-
Darden, finding the analysis to be the same under both tests.113  Finally, courts 
have often relied on the federal definition of “employee” for state statutes that 
mirror and/or supplement federal employment protections.114 
                                                           
107
 Id. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. 
108
 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 757 (“The general rule is that sexual harassment by a supervisor is not 
conduct within the scope of employment.”). 
109
 Id. at 760-65. 
110
 At least as to race and ethnicity discrimination, the dividing line between employees and 
contractors is less important, as Title VII is backstopped by 42 U.S.C. § 1981.  Section 1981 
provides that “[a]ll persons . . . shall have the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts.”  42 
U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).  Thus, the dividing line between employees and nonemployees is not 
relevant to the statutory protection.  However, the statute has only been interpreted as prohibiting 
racial or ethnic discrimination.  See, e.g., Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Ctr., 84 F.3d 522, 527 (2d 
Cir. 1996); Maltby & Yamada, supra note MY1, at 257 (finding that “the scope of the statute . . . 
prohibits discrimination only on the basis of race or ethnicity, thus excluding claims based upon 
other grounds, most notably sex”). 
111
 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (2006). 
112
 OSHA, Opinion Letter to San Luis Obispo Fire Association, April 2, 1996, at: 
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_id=22132&p_table=INTERPRET
ATIONS (citing to Darden and the thirteen-point control test discussed therein). 
113
 Loomis Cabinet Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 20 F.3d 938, 941 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (“Here, the Commission used the economic realities test . . . , but determined that the 
result would be the same under the Darden test. We agree.” (citations omitted)). 
114
 See, e.g., Strother v. Southern Cal. Permanente Med. Group, 79 F.3d 859, 866 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(stating that “California courts have interpreted (the California Fair Housing and Employment 
Act) in accordance with cases interpreting the (ADEA) and the Federal Civil Rights Act . . . (and 
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The NLRA’s definition of “employee” does not itself provide a 
definition of the term.  Instead, the statute simply provides a laundry list of 
exclusions.  Excluded employees include: agricultural workers, domestically-
employed healthcare or family care employees, public-sector employees, 
railroad, airline, and other transportation workers covered by the Railway Labor 
Act (RLA), independent contractors, and supervisors. 115   The Act did not 
originally exclude independent contractors, and both the National Labor 
Relations Board and the Supreme Court originally held that so-called 
“newsboys” were statutory employees for purposes of the Act, even though they 
were considered independent contractors.116  The Court explicitly rejected the 
common law distinction between employees and independent contractors, 
holding that the news vendors in question were “subject, as a matter of 
economic fact, to the evils the statute was designed to eradicate.”117  However, 
Congress rejected this interpretation of the Act and moved in 1947 to add 
independent contractors specifically to the list of excluded categories.  The 
Board then adopted the common-law right to control test in excluding 
independent contractors.  The Supreme Court sanctioned this test in NLRB v. 
United Insurance Co.,118 making clear that the Board had a range of discretion 
in implementing the test. 
The Board has had occasion to rule on employee status in a variety of 
contexts: newspaper carriers,119 nightclub performers,120 gas station operators,121 
and novelty vendors.122  Two recurring areas of difficulty have been delivery 
truck drivers and taxicab operators.  In both cases, the workers may own their 
equipment, but they often operate within a system created and regulated by one 
overall company.  Thus the Board has found both ways on employee status 
                                                                                                                                                               
therefore) we look to federal cases in those areas that have addressed whatever an individual 
labelled as a partner can be considered an employee for the purpose of employment discrimination 
laws”) (citation omitted); Lilley v. BTM Corp. 958 F.2d 746, 750 n.2 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that 
“ADEA standards governing employment status also apply to Michigan's Elliot-Larsen Act, Mich. 
Comp. Laws, S 37.2101 et seq”); Frishberg v. Esprit De Corp., Inc. 778 F. Supp. 793, 798 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that “(s)ince New York distinguishes between employees and 
independent contractors in a sufficiently similar manner, the court will use the federal test for both 
state and federal claims”) (footnote omitted). 
115
 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006). 
116
 N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
117
 Id. at 127. 
118
 390 U.S. 254 (1968).  Noting that “[t]here are innumerable situations which arise in the 
common law where it is difficult to say whether a particular individual is an employee or an 
independent contractor," the Court required courts to uphold reasonable determinations “even 
though a court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de 
novo.” Id. at 258, 260. 
119
 Compare Philadelphia Newspapers, 238 N.L.R.B. 835 (1978) (finding distributors to be 
employees) with Glen Falls Newspapers, 303 N.L.R.B. 614 (1991) (finding distributors to be 
independent contractors). 
120
 Harrah’s Club v. N.L.R.B., 446 F.32d 471(9th Cir. 1971) (finding such performers to be 
independent contractors). 
121
 American Oil Co., 188 N.L.R.B. 438 (1971) (finding operators to be independent contractors). 
122
 ARA Leisure Servs. V. N.L.R.B., 782 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1986) (upholding the Board’s 
conclusion that such workers were employees). 
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depending on variations between the structures of the jobs.  In Roadway 
Package Systems, Inc.,123 the Board found delivery truck drivers working for a 
nationwide package delivery company to be employees, based on their lack of 
prior experience, their (de facto) exclusive arrangements with the company, and 
the uniformity of their operating procedures.  However, in a companion case, 
the board found the drivers in Dial-A-Mattress Operating Corp. 124  to be 
independent contractors.  The Dial-A-Mattress drivers had much more 
flexibility in choosing and outfitting their trucks, and their trucks displayed the 
names of the individual trucker’s company.  The Board has used these two cases 
as lodestars in more recent analyses.125 
The Board has taken care to emphasize that the common-law agency test, 
although often called the “control” test, has many factors in play beyond 
control.  Thus, while control may be important in determining employee status, 
it is not the controlling factor.  Instead, the variety of factors listed in 
Restatement Second of Agency § 220 are to be considered.126  And although it is 
not specifically part of the list of factors in § 220, the Board has used the 
presence of entrepreneurial opportunities as another factor in evaluating the 
independence of the workers.127  The Board has rejected the addition of the 
FLSA’s “economic dependence” or “economic realities” test, 128  however, 
despite a recent dissent.129 
Despite the doctrinal popularity of the “control” test, it remains something 
of an enigma.  Courts and commentators continue to bemoan its inability to 
deliver clear answers.130  In its initial rejection of the control test in the context of 
the NLRA, the Supreme Court said that “the assumed simplicity and uniformity, 
resulting from application of ‘common-law standards,’ does not exist.” 131  
                                                           
123
 326 N.L.R.B. 842 (1998). 
124
 326 N.L.R.B. 884 (1998). 
125
 See St. Joseph New-Press, 345 N.L.R.B. 474 (2005).   
126
 The Roadway Express Board stated: 
While we recognize that the common-law agency test described by the Restatement ultimately 
assesses the amount or degree of control exercised by an employing entity over an individual, we 
find insufficient basis for the proposition that those factors which do not include the concept of 
“control” are insignificant when compared to those that do. Section 220(2) of the Restatement 
refers to 10 pertinent factors as “among others,” thereby specifically permitting the consideration 
of other relevant factors as well, depending on the factual circumstances presented.… Thus, the 
common-law agency test encompasses a careful examination of all factors and not just those that 
involve a right of control.… To summarize, in determining the distinction between an employee 
and an independent contractor under Section 2(3) of the Act, we shall apply the common-law 
agency test and consider all the incidents of the individual's relationship to the employing entity. 
 
Roadway Express, 326 N.L.R.B. at 850. 
127
 See, e.g., St. Joseph New-Press, 345 N.L.R.B. at 480 (considering entrepreneurial opportunities 
for newspaper deliverers).   
128
 Id. at 481-82. 
129
 Id. at 483-84 (Liebman, Mem., dissenting). 
130
 See, e.g., Carlson, supra note RC2001, at 299 (“After nearly two hundred years of evolution, 
the multi-factored ‘common law’ test begs the question of employee status as much as answers 
it.”). 
131
 N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 122 (1944).  The Court also said: “Few 
problems in the law have given greater variety of application and conflict in results than the cases 
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Perhaps more fundamentally, there is a concern that the idea of control is not the 
proper proxy for the concept of employment.  For some, “control” is too 
expansive a term, going beyond the root notion of supervision that represents the 
employment relationship. 132   For others, control is no longer critical to 
employment, but rather an expression from a bygone era. 133   Several other 
alternatives have arisen from various areas of the law to try to take at least some 
share of the control test’s domain. 
2. The “Economic Realities” Test. — The primary alternative to the 
control test, particularly in the realm of employment law, is the “economic 
realities” or “economic dependence” test.  It is generally interpreted to provide a 
more expansive definition to the term “employee,” one that covers more 
vulnerable workers who may have some aspects of independence from control but 
lack true economic independence.  It has its roots in the interpretation of critical 
Neal Deal statutes soon after their passage.  While clearly rejecting the common-
law control test, these cases did not craft a specific and readily cognizable 
alternative.  Instead, they looked to the purpose of the statutes and attempted to 
glean an approach that harmonized with that purpose. Interpreting the NLRA, the 
Court noted that it was “not necessary in this case to make a completely definitive 
limitation around the term ‘employee.’”134  But the Court did distinguish between 
the traditional common law definition and a broader perspective based on the ills 
at which the statute was directed.  In other words, the term “employee” was “to be 
determined broadly, in doubtful situations, by underlying economic facts rather 
than technically and exclusively by previously established legal 
classifications.”135  That reference to “economic facts” became “economic reality” 
in later cases defining the category of “employee” in the context of the Social 
                                                                                                                                                               
arising in the borderland between what is clearly an employer-employee relationship and what is 
clearly one of independent entrepreneurial dealing.” Id. at 121. 
132
 The D.C. Circuit argued: 
 
Although this “right-to-control” test requires an evaluation of all the 
circumstances surrounding the relationship between the company and the 
worker, the extent of the actual supervision exercised by a putative employer 
over the means and manner of the workers' performance is the most important 
element to be considered. It is important, however, to distinguish such company 
supervision from company efforts merely to monitor, evaluate, and improve the 
results or ends of the worker's performance.  Supervision of the means and 
manner of the worker's performance renders him an employee, while steps taken 
to monitor, evaluate, and improve the results of his work, without supervision 
over the means by and manner in which he does his work, indicates that the 
worker is an independent contractor. 
 
C.C. Eastern, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 60 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
133
 FedEx Home Delivery v. N.L.R.B., 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“Gradually, however, 
a verbal formulation emerged that sought to identify the essential quantum of independence that 
separates a contractor from an employee, a process . . . where we used words like control but 
struggled to articulate exactly what we meant by them. . . . In other words, ‘control’ was close to 
what we were trying to capture, but it wasn't a perfect concurrence. It was as if the sheet music just 
didn't quite match the tune.”). 
134
 N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944). 
135
 Id. at 129. 
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Security Act 136  and the Fair Labor Standards Act.137   This test—lacking any 
factors or even specific doctrinal definition—was something of a gestalt or 
eyeball standard, designed to look at the overall economic relationship and 
determine whether Congress intended such a relationship to come under the 
purview of the particular statutory scheme. 
Although the Court’s “economic reality” definition was overturned by 
statutory amendments to both the NLRA138 and the Social Security Act,139 it has 
remained in place with regard to the FLSA.  That statute’s definition of employee 
is the circular one found in many statutes: “the term ‘employee’ means any 
individual employed by an employer.” 140   However, the Act also defines 
“employ” to include “suffer or permit to work.”141  Because employ is defined 
differently and more broadly, the Supreme Court has recognized that the FLSA 
may extend to cover workers beyond the reach of the common law agency test.142 
The definition of “employee” under the FMLA incorporates the standard from the 
FLSA by reference,143 and thus courts have applied the same “economic realities” 
test.144  Outside of these contexts, however, the Supreme Court has made it clear 
that the “control” test is to apply as the default rule. 
According to the “economic realities” test, “employees are those who as a 
matter of economic reality are dependent upon the business to which they render 
service.”145  Courts have generally looked to a number of factors in calculating 
                                                           
136
 United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947) (“We concluded that, since that end was the 
elimination of labor disputes and industrial strife, ‘employees' included workers who were such as 
a matter of economic reality.” (discussing N.L.R.B. v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 
(1944)). 
137
 Goldberg v. Whitaker House Co-Op., Inc., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961) (holding that “the ‘economic 
reality’ rather than ‘technical concepts' is to be the test of employment”).   
138
 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, Pub.L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (June 23, 1947), as 
codified 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006). 
139
 SOCIAL SECURITY ACT OF 1948, ch. 468, § 2(a), 62 Stat. 438 (1948) (changing definition of 
employee to exclude those who “under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the 
employer-employee relationship, has the status of independent contractor”). 
140
 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2006). 
141
 Id. § 203(g). 
142
 See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (noting that the FLSA 
“stretches the meaning of ‘employee’ to cover some parties who might not qualify as such under a 
strict application of traditional agency law principles”).  See also Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. 
Sec’y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 302 (1985) (“The test of employment under the Act is one of 
“economic reality . . . .” (citing Goldberg, 366 U.S. at 33)). 
143
 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2006) (“ The terms “employ”, “employee”, and “State” have the same 
meanings given such terms in subsections (c), (e), and (g) of section 203 of this title.”).   
144
 Nichols v. All Points Transp. Corp. of Mich., Inc. 364 F.Supp.2d 621, 630 (E.D. Mich. 2005) 
(“ Because the statutory definition of FMLA, unlike the definition found in ERISA, incorporates 
the FLSA's broader definition of ‘employee’ and ‘employ,’ the court will continue to apply the 
‘economic realities’ test as described by the Sixth Circuit . . . .”).  According to one survey, 
however, courts have not applied a consistent test when it comes to individual liability under the 
Act.  See Sandra F. Sperino, Chaos Theory: The Unintended Consequences of Expanding 
Individual Liability Under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 9 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 
175, 176 (2005) (finding that courts have utilized seven different tests in determining individual 
liability for owners, executives, and supervisors). 
145
 Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) (interpreting tax provisions), quoted in 
Mednick v. Albert Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 299 (5th Cir. 1975) (interpreting the FLSA). 
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coverage under the “economic realities” test.  One popular test, developed in 
Bonette v. California Health and Welfare Agency,146 asks whether the employer: 
(1) had the power to hire and fire the employee; (2) supervised and controlled 
employee work schedules or conditions of employment; (3) determined the rate 
and method of payment; and (4) maintained employment records. 147   Other 
circuits have more closely mirrored the control test.148  But in recognition of the 
FLSA’s broader coverage, courts have either implicitly or explicitly looked to the 
“reality” of the workers’ dependence on the putative employer. 149   Such 
dependence is often manifested through the economic weakness of the workers, 
and the focus on economic reality is meant to cut through formalistic trappings to 
get at the heart of the relationship.150  In Secretary of Labor v. Lauritzen,151 for 
example, the court held that migrant workers on a pickle farm were employees 
because they “depend on the [employer’s] land, crops, agricultural expertise, 
equipment, and marketing skills.”152 
The economic realities test remains the strongest contender in opposition 
to the control test.  Its concern with economic dependence provides more 
protection to vulnerable workers.153  However, although foreign jurisdictions have 
                                                           
146
 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983), overruled on other grounds, Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
147
 Bonnette, 704 F.2d at 1470. See also Benjamin F. Burry, Testing Economic Reality: FLSA and 
Title VII Protection for Workfare Participants, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM 561, 564 ("Bonnette 
factors have been utilized by most federal circuits, including the Second Circuit."). 
148
 United States v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1535 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Among the criteria courts 
have considered are the following six: 1) the nature and degree of the alleged employer's control 
as to the manner in which the work is to be performed; 2) the alleged employee's opportunity for 
profit or loss depending upon his managerial skill; 3) the alleged employee's investment in 
equipment or materials required for his task, or his employment of workers; 4) whether the service 
rendered requires a special skill; 5) the degree of permanency and duration of the working 
relationship; 6) the extent to which the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged 
employer's business.”); Hopkins v. Cornerstone America, 545 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir. 2008) (“To 
aid us in this inquiry, we consider five non-exhaustive factors: (1) the degree of control exercised 
by the alleged employer; (2) the extent of the relative investments of the worker and the alleged 
employer; (3) the degree to which the worker's opportunity for profit or loss is determined by the 
alleged employer; (4) the skill and initiative required in performing the job; and (5) the 
permanency of the relationship.”) 
149
 Lauritzen, 835 F.2d at 1538 (describing economic dependence as “the focus of all the other 
considerations”); Hopkins, 545 F.3d at 346 (“As a matter of economic reality, the Sales Leaders 
were dependent upon Cornerstone to such an extent that they could not plausibly be considered ‘in 
business for [themselves].’”). 
150
 Mednick v. Albert Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 297, 299-302 (5th Cir.1975) (characterizing the 
ultimate inquiries as: “Is [the worker] the kind of person meant to be protected by the F.L.S.A.? Is 
he dependent upon finding employment in the business of others . . ., (one of) those who 
themselves are least able in good times to make provisions for their needs when old age and 
unemployment may cut off their earnings?” (quotations omitted)). 
151
 835 F.2d 1529 (7th Cir. 1987). 
152
 Id. at 1538. 
153
 COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 63 (1994), at: 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1004&context=key_workplace 
(“The definition of employee in labor, employment, and tax law should be modernized, simplified, 
and standardized.  Instead of the control test borrowed from the old common law of master and 
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adopted concepts such as “dependent contractors” and “employee-like” persons, 
such workers have received only partial protections of the various employment 
regimes.154   An opposing strain of cases and commentators argues that those 
workers who have their own entrepreneurial opportunities should not be 
characterized as employees, regardless of notions of dependence.155  As a result, 
some of the most vulnerable workers may not receive protection.  Finally, some 
have argued that the purpose of the statute should control, rather than notions of 
employment.  This approach has not taken hold in the law, and to some extent it 
rejects the very idea of a common notion of employment. 
3. The “Entrepreneurial Opportunities” Test. — Despite the 
Supreme Court’s explicit approval of the common-law agency test, the D.C. 
Circuit appears to have adopted a new test based on the “entrepreneurial 
opportunities” afforded to workers.  The circuit first adopted this test in 
Corporate Express Delivery Systems v. NLRB, 156  in which it held that the 
determination of employee status should “focus not upon the employer's control 
of the means and manner of the work but instead upon whether the putative 
independent contractors have a significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or 
loss.”157  The court justified the shift on the following grounds: 
 
. . .[T]he latter factor better captures the distinction between an 
employee and an independent contractor. For example, as the 
Board points out, “the full-time cook is regarded as a servant 
[rather than as an independent contractor] although it is understood 
that the employer will exercise no control over the cooking.” 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 202(1) cmt. d (1957). 
Similarly, a corporate executive is an employee despite enjoying 
substantial control over the manner in which he does his job. 
Conversely, a lawn-care provider who periodically services each of 
several sites is an independent contractor regardless how closely 
his clients supervise and control his work. The full-time cook and 
the executive are employees and the lawn-care provider is an 
independent contractor not because of the degree of supervision 
under which each labors but because of the degree to which each 
functions as an entrepreneur - that is, takes economic risk and has 
the corresponding opportunity to profit from working smarter, not 
just harder.158 
 
In FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB,159  the circuit confirmed this new 
“entrepreneurial opportunities” test as the proper standard for evaluating 
                                                                                                                                                               
servant, the definition should be based on the economic realities underlying the relationship 
between the worker and the party benefiting from the worker’s services.”). 
154
 Davidov, supra note GD2005, at 61 (discussing Canada and Germany). 
155
 FedEx Home Delivery v. N.L.R.B., 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
156
 292 F3d 777 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
157
 Id. at 780. 
158
 Id.  
159
 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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employee status.  The majority allowed that the common-law agency test 
remained the proper standard, but argued that entrepreneurial opportunities was 
“an important animating principle by which to evaluate [the common-law 
agency] factors.”160  The court explicitly rejected control as the primary factor, 
citing its indefiniteness as well as its failure to capture the essence of employee 
status.161  The dissent found that the majority’s “entrepreneurial opportunities” 
test failed to follow the Supreme-Court-approved common-law test, 162  a 
contention supported by other commentators.163  However, the test has gained 
the support of the Restatement Third of Employment Law, which defines 
“employee” as one who works in the interests of the employer when “the 
employer’s relationship with the individual effectively prevents the individual 
from rendering the services as part of an independent business.” 164   The 
Restatement defines this as follows: “An individual renders services as part of an 
independent business when the individual in his or her interest exercises 
entrepreneurial control over the manner and means by which the services are 
performed.”165  The Restatement commentary agrees with the FedEx court that 
the common-law right to control test “looks not only to the principal’s control of 
the physical details of how the service provider performs the work but also to 
other factors relevant to whether the service provider has entrepreneurial control 
over the manner and means by which the services are performed.”166  Thus, the 
essential question is: does the individual perform the work as part of the employer 
as a firm or separately through a different and independent business entity?167 
 
B. Defining “Scope of Employment” 
 
Unlike the competing definitions for the term “employee,” the term “scope 
of employment” has not been the subject of various theoretical approaches.  The 
term is not generally used in labor and employment statutes, as in most cases the 
nature of the rights provided to employees guarantees that they concern activities 
                                                           
160
 Id. at 497. 
161
 Id. (“It was as if the sheet music didn’t quite match the tune.”). 
162
 Id. at 510 (Garland, J., dissenting). 
163
 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Employee or Entrepreneur?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 353, 357 
(2011) (arguing that the D.C. Circuit’s new test “directly contradicts Supreme Court precedent”). 
164
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, § 1.01(1) (Tent. Draft, 2009).  The full 
definition is: “Unless otherwise provided by law or § 1.02 or § 1.03, an individual renders services 
as an employee of an employer if: (1) the individual acts, at least in part, to serve the interests of 
the employer, (2) the employer consents to receive the individual’s services, and (c) the 
employer’s relationship with the individual effectively prevents the individual from rendering the 
services as part of an independent business.” 
165
 Id. § 1.01(2).  Entrepreneurial control is further defined as “control over important business 
decisions, including whether to hire and where to assign assistants, whether to purchase and where 
to deploy equipment, and whether and when to service other customers.”  Id. § 1.01(3). 
166
 Id. § 1.01 cmt. a. 
167
 As the Restatement frames it: “Employees do not provide their services as an independent 
business.”  Id.; see also id. § 1.01 cmt. d (“The key question is whether a service provider 
functions as an independent business while performing services on the principal’s behalf.”). 
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within the scope of employment. 168   The one primary exception is workers’ 
compensation, which only provides protections against injuries incurred within 
the scope of employment.169  Outside of labor and employment law, employers 
are only liable for the torts and crimes of their employees in such actions are 
taken within the scope of employment.170  And intellectual property protections 
generally only apply to works made within the scope of employment.171 
The general definition for scope of employment is that zone of employee 
conduct in which the employee is performing her job duties.172  Efforts to define 
employees’ duties as excluding all torts, statutory violations, or criminal activity 
have generally been unavailing.173  Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, if 
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 For example, the NLRA concerns the rights of employees to bargain with their employer; Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act specifically addresses discrimination in the context of employment; 
ERISA involves pension and healthcare rights within the employment relationship; and FLSA 
involves mandatory terms within the employment relationship.  Once it is established that the 
party is an employee and that the firm is the employer, there is no need to further establish that the 
actions in question took place within the scope of employment—they do by the very nature of the 
statutory protections. 
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 See Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV. 916, 918 (1980) 
("To qualify for workers' compensation, the employee must suffer a personal injury 'by accident' 
'arising out of and in the course of employment.'"). 
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 See supra Part I.B, C. 
171
 See supra Part I.D. 
172
 See, e.g., McGrail v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 190 Wash. 272, 277, 67 P.2d 851 (1937) (“The 
test for determining whether an employee is, at a given time, in the course of his employment, is 
whether the employee was, at the time, engaged in the performance of the duties required of him 
by his contract of employment or by the specific direction of his employer, or, as sometimes 
stated, whether he was engaged at the time in the furtherance of the employer's interests.”). 
 The doctrinal definition for “scope of employment” can be quite detailed.  For example, 
Restatement Second of Agency has two provisions devoted to defining scope of employment, both 
with lengthy lists of factors.  See Restatement Second of Agency § 228(1) (defining conduct as 
within the scope of employment "if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) 
it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, 
by a purpose to serve the master, and (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against 
another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master”); id. § 229(2) (“In determining 
whether or not the conduct, although not authorized, is nevertheless so similar to or incidental to 
the conduct authorized as to be within the scope of employment, the following matters of fact are 
to be considered: (a) whether or not the act is one commonly done by such servants; (b) the time, 
place and purpose of the act; (c) the previous relations between the master and the servant; (d) the 
extent to which the business of the master is apportioned between different servants; (e) whether 
or not the act is outside the enterprise of the master or, if within the enterprise, has not been 
entrusted to any servant; (f) whether or not the master has reason to expect that such an act will be 
done; (g) the similarity in quality of the act done to the act authorized; (h) whether or not the 
instrumentality by which the harm is done has been furnished by the master to the servant; (i) the 
extent of departure from the normal method of accomplishing an authorized result; and (j) whether 
or not the act is seriously criminal.”)  Like the control test, however, these factors are in service to 
an overriding principle: namely, whether the employee was acting as an employee or in her 
personal capacity.  
173
 See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 800-803 (1998) (rejecting the notion 
that supervisor sexual harassment takes place outside of the scope of employment because it is 
against company policy or motivated by personal desires).  But see Note, “Scope of Employment” 
Redefined: Holding Employers Vicariously Liable for Sexual Assaults Committed by their 
Employees, 76 MINN. L. REV. 1513, 1521-1522, and nn. 33, 34 (1992) (collecting non-Title VII 
cases in which sexual assaults are determined to fall outside the scope of employment). 
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the employee is on the job or within a zone of activity related to the employment 
duties, the employer will generally be liable for the employee’s tort, regardless of 
the employer’s efforts to define such conduct as outside of the employee’s duties 
or authority.  Instead, courts have adopted something along the lines of a 
foreseeability test, in which the employer is liable if the employee’s actions are in 
some way foreseeable.  In two famous cases involving drunken sailors, both 
Judge Hand and Judge Friendly found employers liable for acts of violence to 
person and property taken by intoxicated employees.174  In both cases, however, 
the courts found that the actions were taken within the sailors’ overall context of 
employment and that therefore the employer was liable.  Moreover, an employer 
may be liable for employee actions taken outside of the scope of employment if 
the master retains some level of responsibility (through intent, recklessness, or 
nondelegable duty) or if the employee was aided in some way by apparent 
authority or the agency relationship itself.175  Given “the proclivity of seamen to 
find solace for solitude by copious resort to the bottle while ashore,” their acts of 
violence—while regrettable and unauthorized—were sufficiently foreseeable to 
be part of the costs of doing such business.176 
Thus, the overriding notion for “scope of employment” categorization 
questions has usually concerned not whether the particular employee is following 
the script of her particular contractual relationship with the employer, but rather 
whether the activity is part and parcel of the overall employment relationship.177  
The employer is expected to absorb the costs of doing business as a firm, which 
includes a certain level of employee activity that may not directly inure to the 
employer’s benefit.  As the Restatement Second of Agency put it, the “ultimate 
question” in determining the scope of employment is “whether or not it is just that 
the loss resulting from the servant's acts should be considered as one of the 
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 Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1967) (Friendly, J.); Nelson 
v. American-West African Line, 86 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1936) (Hand, J.). 
175
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1957) (“A master is not subject to liability for 
the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless: (a) the master 
intended the conduct or the consequences, or (b) the master was negligent or reckless, or (c) the 
conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or (d) the servant purported to act or to speak 
on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in 
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.”). 
176
 Bushey, 398 F.2d at 172.  The Restatement Second of Agency has a complex set of interrelated 
provisions attempting to define scope of employment.  Along with a ten-factor test for determining 
whether certain kinds of unauthorized acts may fall within the scope of employment, 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229(2) (1957), the Restatement has separate provisions on 
criminal or tortious conduct, id. § 231, failures to act, id. § 232, conduct not for the purpose of 
serving the master, id. § 235, and instrumentalities of employment used outside of the relationship, 
id. § 238.  Another instance along this boundary is whether the employer is liable to an 
unauthorized passenger.  See Rahman v. State, 246 P.3d 182 (Wash. 2011) (finding employer 
liable for injury to unauthorized passenger); 2011 WASH. LEGIS. SERV. Ch. 82 (absolving 
employer of liability for unauthorized passenger). 
177
 See Alan O. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope 
of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1988) (“The scope of 
employment limitation upon respondeat superior liability may be understood in many instances as 
a way to limit the employer's liability to torts that are ‘caused’ by the business enterprise.”). 
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normal risks to be borne by the business in which the servant is employed.”178  
Or, as then-Judge Cardozo put it, “The risks of injury incurred in the crowded 
contacts of the factory through the acts of fellow workmen are not measured by 
the tendency of such acts to serve the master's business. Many things that have no 
such tendency are done by workmen every day. . . . The test of liability is the 
relation of the service to the injury, of the employment to the risk.”179 
 
C. Perspectives on the Theories of Employment 
 
The existing common law doctrine defining “employee” has been routinely 
criticized along two major axes.  First, it is frequently accused of being a formless 
multi-factor test that yields disparate results over time.180  The proliferation of 
multifactor tests, both from courts and from the Restatements, has shifted the 
traditional test away from the notion of “control” to something closer to a 
formless standard.181  As a result, the “control” test no longer really focuses solely 
on control (if it ever really did, after Blackstone).  Although courts often refer to 
control as a “touchstone” or a “primary factor,” the other factors have come into 
play as well.  In fact, the same criticism can be leveled at the “economic realities” 
test, which is often framed as a collection of factors with an overall “economic 
gestalt” factor thrown in at the end.182  Even the “entrepreneurial opportunities” 
test has been framed as a reconception of the common law test.183 
Second, the common-law test is attacked for its general applicability.  
Because the test serves as an across-the-board definition of “employee,” it is not 
specifically tailored towards the purposes that particular legal regimes are 
designed to address.  As such, the very idea of employment has come under fire; 
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 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 cmt. a (1957).   
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 Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 128 N.E. 711, 712 (N.Y. 1920). 
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 See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. United Ins. Co., of America, 390 U.S. 254, 258 (1968) (“There are 
innumerable situations which arise in the common law where it is difficult to say whether a 
particular individual is an employee or an independent contractor . . . ."); N.L.R.B. v. Hearst 
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 121 (1944) (“Few problems in the law have given greater variety 
of application and conflict in results than the cases arising in the borderland between what is 
clearly an employer-employee relationship and what is clearly one of independent entrepreneurial 
dealing.”); FedEx Home Delivery v. N.L.R.B., 563 F.3d 492, 496 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“While this 
seems simple enough, the Restatement's non-exhaustive ten-factor test is not especially amenable 
to any sort of bright-line rule, a long-recognized rub.”); Kisner v. Jackson, 159 Miss. 424, 427-28, 
132 So. 90 (1931) (“There have been many attempts to define precisely what is meant by the term 
‘independent contractor’; but the variations in the wording of these attempts have resulted only in 
establishing the proposition that it is not possible within the limitations of language to lay down a 
concise definition that will furnish any universal formula, covering all cases"); Carlson, supra note 
RC2001, at 298-99 (arguing that the common-law doctrine “encourages ambiguity” and has 
become “more complex” and “less predictable”).   
181
 See id. at 310 (discussing how courts had added most of these factors by the end of the 
nineteenth century).   
182
 See, e.g., Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1535 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing six 
factors, in addition to economic dependence, that go into the “economic realities” test). 
183
 FedEx Home Delivery v. N.L.R.B., 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“In other words, 
‘control’ was close to what we were trying to capture, but it wasn't a perfect concurrence. It was as 
if the sheet music just didn't quite match the tune.”). 
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as one commentator has asked, “why should employee status matter at all?”184  
Instead of creating a category of “employee” that applies in a variety of different 
situations, critics contend that courts, regulators, and legislators should focus 
instead on the particular purpose of a particular legal regime and should tailor 
coverage to meet that purpose.  In discussing the statutory definition of employee 
within the FLSA, Judge Easterbrook argued that the statutory purposes of that 
statute were quite different from the common-law concerns at issue in the control 
test.185  Instead of having a uniform definition across legal regimes, it would be 
more appropriate, argued the judge, to develop definitions based on the functions 
of the particular law. 
Arguably, the Supreme Court began using the functional approach for the 
New Deal statutes.  Along with discussing the “economic reality” at hand, the 
Court in NLRB v. Hearst Publications186 said that the definition of employee in 
the NLRA “must be read in light of the mischief to be corrected and the end to be 
attained.”187  However, Congress soon moved to amend both the NLRA and the 
Social Security Act to reinstate the common-law control test. 188   The deeper 
theoretical problem for the purpose test is its abandonment of any common notion 
of employment.  If certain regimes are based on the notion of “employee” to 
determine the extent of coverage, then arguably the concept of employment is part 
of the overall system of regulation.  The purpose-oriented approach seeks to deny, 
to a greater or lesser extent, the theoretical basis for this commonality.  And yet 
the concept of employment retains rhetorical and policy force.  Indeed, even 
proponents of the function or purpose test concede that Congress has continually 
gone back to the “employee” category to shape the contours for various areas of 
the law. 189   As such, the biggest problem for the purpose-oriented theory of 
employment is that it has no theory of employment at all. 
 
 
III. EMPLOYEES AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM 
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 Carlson, supra note RC2001, at 299. 
185
 See Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1543-45 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., 
concurring).  Judge Easterbrook described the three purposes of the FLSA as preventing workers 
from working abnormally long hours, spreading work and thereby reduce unemployment, and 
protecting the overtime workers from themselves.  In contrast, he described the purpose of 
vicarious liability as creating proper incentives to take care against harm and to potentially spread 
the risk of loss.  Id.  He argued: “The reasons for blocking vicarious liability at a particular point 
have nothing to do with the functions of the FLSA.”  Id. at 1544. 
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 322 U.S. 111 (1944). 
187
 Id. at 124 (quoting S. Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 259 (1940)). 
188
 LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, Pub.L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (June 23, 1947), as 
codified 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006); SOCIAL SECURITY ACT OF 1948, ch. 468, § 2(a), 62 Stat. 438 
(1948) (changing definition of employee to exclude those who “under the usual common law rules 
applicable in determining the employer-employee relationship, has the status of independent 
contractor”). 
189
 See Carlson, supra note RC2001, at 300 (“The courts, of course, cannot abandon employee 
status as a test as long as Congress and state legislatures continue to make employee status the 
clearly stated basis for statutory coverage.”).   
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Although we think of employees and employment as involving work or 
labor, the legal definitions of those terms has much more to do with the 
relationship between the individual worker and the person or entity for whom she 
works.  Employment is not simply labor; it is labor within a particular context.  
And that context requires an employer.  In the modern economy, employees 
always work within the context of an economic firm.  In fact, it is my contention 
that it is the very existence of a firm that creates the employment relationship.  In 
this Part, I examine how the theory of the firm in economic and organizational 
literature has focused on the employment relationship, and how being an 
“employee” really means providing one’s labor within the context of a firm. 
Employees have been central to our conception of the firm from the start.  
In early neoclassical economics, the theory of firm was quite rudimentary; it 
simply saw the firm as a black box which took in inputs and produced outputs.  
No further dissection was undertaken.  However, this theory did differentiate 
between what was inside the firm and what was outside: employees and capital 
assets were inside, while customers and suppliers were outside.190 Although this 
conception of the firm was useful in early economic modeling and retains that 
purpose even today, it was ripe for a reinvestigation that endeavored to give it 
substance. 
Ronald Coase started the exploration of the internal workings and purpose 
of the firm in The Nature of the Firm.191  In an oft-quoted passage, Coase framed 
the issue this way: 
 
Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is 
coordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the 
market.  Within a firm these market transactions are eliminated, 
and in place of the complicated market structure with exchange 
transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-coordinator, who 
directs production.  It is clear that these are alternative methods of 
coordinating production.  Yet, having regard to the fact that, if 
production is regulated by price movements, production could be 
carried on without any organization at all, well we might ask, why 
is there any organization?192 
 
Coase’s answer was that the price mechanism can be costly.  For certain 
transactions, it is cheaper to simply direct the production to occur rather than 
contracting separately for it.  In order to avoid the transaction costs of contracting, 
such transactions will occur within a firm rather than on an open market.193 
Of course, the firm-based transactions described by Coase involve the 
purchase of labor for a particular endeavor.  In explaining these transactions, 
Coase stated: “If a workman moves from department Y to department X, he does 
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 Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the 
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 Coase, supra note RC1. 
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 Id. at 388. 
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 Id. at 390-92. 
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not go because of a change in relative prices, but because he was ordered to do 
so.”194  The relationship between the entrepreneur-coordinator and the employee 
is the primary distinction between the firm and the market.  It is the reason for the 
firm’s existence.  Coase seemed to be arguing that firms would be unnecessary 
but for the need to remove the employment relationship from the vagaries of 
market transactions. 
This conclusion is cemented when Coase considered “whether the concept 
of a firm which has been developed fits in with that existing in the real world.”195  
His answer?  “We can best approach the question of what constitutes a firm in 
practice by considering the legal relationship normally called that of ‘master and 
servant’ or ‘employer and employee.’”196    He then quoted at length from a 
treatise concerning the common law “control” test, which provides that “[t]he 
master must have the right to control the servant’s work, either personally or by 
another servant or agent.”197  He concluded: “We thus see that it is the fact of 
direction which is the essence of the legal concept of ‘employer and employee,’ 
just as it was in the economic concept which was developed above.”198   For 
Coase, the firm was defined by the employer-employee relationship.199 
In an important response to Coase’s work, Armen Alchian and Harold 
Demsetz also focused on the relationship of employees with other participants 
within the structure of the firm.200  However, they argued that Coase’s focus on 
control, authority, and direction was misleading.201  Instead, they framed their 
argument in these terms: 
 
Telling an employee to type this letter rather than to file that 
document is like my telling a grocer to sell me this brand of tuna 
rather than that brand of bread.  I have no contract to continue to 
purchase from the grocer and neither the employer nor the 
employee is bound by any contractual obligations to continue the 
relationship.  Long-term contracts between employer and 
employee are not the essence of the organization we call a firm.202 
 
Alchian and Demsetz’s critique of Coase’s theory does not mean that employees 
are no longer central to the idea of the firm.  Instead, they argue that the 
importance of the firm (as separate from the market) stems from the need to 
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 See Eric W. Orts, Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 265, 296-97 (1998). 
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 Alchian & Demsetz, supra note AD1, at 777 (“When a lumber mill employs a cabinetmaker, 
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 Id. (“To speak of managing, directing, or assigning workers to various tasks is a deceptive way 
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coordinate production in the midst of a variety of inputs.  The need for a system 
of team production is what separates firms from markets.  Alchian and Demsetz 
defined team production as “production in which 1) several types of resources are 
used and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating 
resource.” 203   As a result, team production is used when the team method 
increases productivity, after factoring out the costs associated with monitoring 
and disciplining the team.204 
Alchian and Demsetz’s model seems even more focused on the role of the 
employee within the firm than Coase’s model.  The primary concern of team 
production is making sure that the team members do not shirk their 
responsibilities to the team.  The inability to measure individual contributions to 
productivity is what makes the firm an efficient alternative to markets, but it is 
also the firm’s central governance problem.  Alchian and Demsetz argued that a 
specialized, independent monitor may be the best way of insuring that the team 
members all contribute appropriately and are rewarded appropriately.205   That 
central monitor – the recipient of the residual profits – would be the firm.  
Although Coase as well as Alchian and Demsetz personified this monitor in the 
role of an entrepreneur-coordinator, such a collapse of powers into one human 
being is only possible in the smallest of firms.  In order to meet the criteria set 
down by the model,206 the central component of team production is the firm itself: 
a “person” who contracts for all other team inputs. 
It could be argued that Alchian and Demsetz conceived of a firm detached 
from employees, since the Alchian-Demsetz monitor must be outside the 
production process while being able to negotiate with all team members for their 
input and compensation.  However, unless the “firm” is a sole proprietor, that 
monitor is merely a mechanism for providing coordination of inputs.  And 
employees are the primary source of the inputs.207  Thus, the Alchian-Demsetz 
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 Id. at 779. 
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 Id. at 780. 
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206
 Alchian and Demsetz set forth the following characteristics of the firm: (a) joint input 
production, (b) several input owners, (c) one party is common to all the contracts of the joint 
inputs, (d) who has the rights to renegotiate any input’s contract independently of contracts with 
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central contractual residual status.  Id. at 783. 
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 Alchian and Demsetz seem to believe that the firm will be represented by a central figure who 
has claim to the entire residual, and thus an interest in coordinating the firm most efficiently.  But 
they say nothing about who can appoint such a central figure, and they express skepticism about 
the ability of shareholders to perform the monitoring function.  Rather than characterize 
shareholders as owners, they argue that shareholders should be viewed merely as investors, like 
bondholders, albeit “more optimistic” ones.  They ask: 
 
In sum, is it the case that the stockholder-investor relationship is one emanating 
from the division of ownership among several people, or is it that the collection 
of investment funds from people of various anticipations is the underlying factor?  
If the latter, why should any of them be thought of as the owners in whom voting 
rights, whatever they may signify or however exercisable, should reside in order 
to enhance efficiency?  Why voting rights in any of the outside, participating 
investors? 
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team production model does not exclude employees from the definition of the 
firm.  Although their model, with its focus on “inputs,” broadens the scope of the 
firm to include investors as well as employees, the purpose of the Alchian-
Demsetz firm remains the management of employees through the coordination of 
team production. 
As theorists moved beyond these foundational works and into empirical 
research, the identification of transaction costs, monitoring costs, and team 
production have remained central concepts.  Using the transaction-costs model, 
Oliver Williamson and others have identified the types of contractual difficulties 
which are likely to lead to firm governance, rather than market solutions.208  In 
situations where contributions and compensation can be harder to define, the 
parties will be left with incomplete contracts that require a governance structure to 
prevent opportunism.  This opportunism will be particularly problematic where 
one or both of the parties must invest significant resources in assets specific to the 
particular firm, project, or transaction.  This asset specificity makes the parties 
susceptible to hold-ups from their contractual partners in the absence of a system 
of governance.  Firms can be useful in providing the structures that deter 
opportunism.209 
The focus on assets has carried over into the “property rights” theory of 
the firm.  This theory, developed in a series of articles by Grossman, Hart, and 
Moore, argues that firms are necessary as a repository of property rights for assets 
used in joint production.210  By owning the property outright, the firm prevents 
the problem of the commons (in which no one holds property rights over valuable 
assets) as well as the problem of the anticommons (in which property rights are 
divvied up amongst too many disparate actors).  The Grossman-Hart-Moore 
model dictates that the firm should be owned by those who contribute the most 
valuable and most asset-specific property to the joint enterprise.  They are not 
only most necessary to the firm’s success; they are also the most vulnerable to 
hold-up problems as the joint enterprise moves forward in time. 
These theories have not focused on the role of the employee in the firm, 
instead focusing on contracts and property rights.  But the role of the employee in 
these models still remains critical.  Although the property rights discussed in the 
model are generally nonhuman assets, the assets are “the glue that keeps the firm 
together”211 and thus keep employees within the firm.  Hart poses the following 
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hypothetical: if firm 1 acquires firm 2, what is to stop workers at former firm 2 
from quitting and forming a new entity? 
 
For firm 1’s acquisition of firm 2 to make any economic sense, 
there must be some source of firm 2 value over and above the 
workers’ human capital, i.e. some ‘glue’ holding firm 2’s workers 
in place.  The source of value may consist of as little as a place to 
meet; the firm’s name, reputation, or distribution network; the 
firm’s files, containing important information about its operations 
or its customers; or a contract that prohibits firm 2’s workers from 
working for competitors or from taking existing clients with them 
when they quit. . . . [W]ithout something holding the firm together, 
the firm is just a phantom.212 
 
Thus, the property-rights theory of the firm is designed in part to explain why the 
firm’s employees remain with the firm.213 
In the transaction costs model, employees’ contributions must be 
recognized as assets of both the firm and the employee – often described as 
“human capital.”  Some types of human capital are transferable, such as education 
or general skills, but other types are specific to the firm and generally worthless 
outside it.  To the extent an employee has invested in firm-specific skills, she is 
subject to opportunistic behavior, since she has little leverage to get the full value 
of those skills.  In the transaction-cost model, employees may be precisely the 
vulnerable yet valuable contributors to the joint enterprise who are most 
vulnerable to opportunistic behavior.214 
Along these lines, Rajan and Zingales have proposed an “access” model of 
power within the firm.215  The model defines a firm “both in terms of unique 
assets (which may be physical or human) and in terms of the people who have 
access to these assets.”216   Access to the unique assets is what defines the power 
of the individuals within and without the firm.  Rajan and Zingales define access 
as “the ability to use, or work with, a critical resource.”217  Examples of critical 
resources include machines, ideas, and people.  As Rajan and Zingales make 
clear, “[t]he agent who is given privileged access to the resource gets no new 
residual rights of control. All she gets is the opportunity to specialize her human 
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capital to the resource and make herself valuable.”218  Combined with her right to 
leave the firm, access gives the employee the ability to “create a critical resource 
that she controls: her specialized human capital.”  Control over this critical 
resource is a source of power.  Rajan and Zingales argue that “[s]ince the amount 
of surplus that she gets from this power is often more contingent on her making 
the right specific investment than the surplus that comes from ownership, access 
can be a better mechanism to provide incentives than ownership.”219   Given the 
importance of access, the role of the firm is to allocate access efficiently amongst 
the firm’s agents.220 
Recent scholarship has taken the role of human capital even further.  One 
aspect of this capital—knowledge—has served as the basis for a new set of 
approaches to the firm.221  Knowledge is defined as both explicit sets of formal 
information as well as the ability to apply a wealth of unspecified information in 
developing an answer or approach to a particular problem.222   As one set of 
knowledge-based theorists explains, “[t]he way the firm develops the knowledge 
it will use in its production process and the extent that firm can bind this 
knowledge to its structure will influence its organizational structure.”223   Rather 
than emphasize the ownership of physical assets, which can be fungible and non-
specific, the knowledge-based theory focuses on the need to produce, distribute, 
and ultimately retain valuable knowledge-based assets within the firm.224  Choices 
between centralized and multi-divisional organizational structures,225 or between 
covenants not to compete and employee stock options, 226  are based on the 
management of knowledge within the firm.  Along the same lines, a capability-
based theory of the firm focuses on firm-specific knowledge and learning that can 
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be translated into joint production.227  This theory also emphasizes the role of 
employees as holders of the firm’s capabilities.228 
Knowledge-based theories of the firm serve as something of a bridge 
between the economic, organizational, and sociological theories as to the nature 
of the firm. 229   Management historians such as Alfred Chandler have long 
considered the actual roles of employees within the firm to be the centerpiece of 
firm dynamics.230  Organizational theory has built upon these insights and carried 
them over to today’s firms, which generally offer flatter hierarchical structures 
and more work in teams.  In fact, one set of scholars examined the role of the firm 
as a “collaborative community” in which employees work together toward 
common goals.231  Such a firm must have a shared ethos of contribution to a 
collective purpose and the success of others;232 it must be structured so as to allow 
for flexible organizational boundaries but highly specialized knowledge; 233  it 
must base status on knowledge and expertise, rather than hierarchy;234 and it must 
create an identity of independence and personal consistency. 235   Such 
collaborative community firms are contrasted with the traditional hierarchical 
firms, which manage employees with a traditional command-and-control 
structure,236 as well as market-based firms, which break down traditional firm 
barriers through outsourcing and contingent workers. 237   This analysis to the 
future of the firm seeks to develop the optimal approach to the relationship 
between a firm and its employees.  Indeed, the driving consideration seems to be 
managing employees in a knowledge-based economy in the most efficient and 
productive way possible.238 
There are theories of the firm, such as the “nexus of contracts” approach, 
that do not single out employees for special primacy of place.239  On the whole, 
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however, approaches to the nature of the firm within a market economy have 
focused in on the role of employees and employment within the firm, as opposed 
to “independent” contracting parties outside of the firm.  This insight has been 
recognized from Coase up through the knowledge-based theories of the present.  
As such, theories of the firm can serve as an intellectual foundation for the 
concept of “employee” and “employment” within the law.  The following Part is 
an initial effort at building this foundation. 
 
IV.  EMPLOYMENT AS PARTICIPATION IN A FIRM 
 
A. Participation as Theory 
 
Coase recognized that in looking for the theory of the firm out in the real 
world, one should look not at the law of entities, but rather the law of 
employment.  Although business organizations are the “firms” considered in 
Coase’s musings, business organizations themselves did not represent the natural 
boundaries of a firm for economics purposes.  Rather, firms were represented by 
the relationship between the legal entity and its employees.  The relationship 
between employer and employee was the “non-market” interaction that justified 
the creation of the firm in the first place. 
The weakness in Coase’s analysis, however, was his overemphasis on the 
concept of “control” within the firm.  Yes, an employee can be directed to work 
on one task rather than another, and an employer can dictate the details of that 
work in a very close manner.  But the nature of the supervision need not be 
significantly different than the close oversight a general contractor provides to a 
subcontractor.  Moreover, given that most employment contracts at at-will, both 
the employer and the employee are free to walk away from the relationship at any 
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time.  The potential long-term nature of an at-will employment relationship seems 
even more fragile than a long-term indefinite contract between two corporations.  
But Coase believed the employment relationship is outside the market, while the 
long-term contract is not. 
And so it is with the control test for employment.  There are two primary 
criticisms of the control test that mirror our concerns with Coase’s theory.  First, 
“control” seems to overstate the power exercised by the employer within the 
relationship, at least with respect to supervision.  An employee can be given a 
relative degree of freedom on the job but still be considered an employee, while 
an independent contractor can be given exacting specifications and still be outside 
the firm.  Even the Restatement Second of Agency recognizes that the degree of 
actual supervisory control is a poor proxy for employment.240  Second, the issue 
of “control” implies that those employees with more power within the 
organization are less like other employees, as they are less controlled than they 
are controlling.  However, when it comes to traditional agency doctrine, the 
power of the employee within the organization is irrelevant to their status as an 
employee.  As the Restatement confirms, “ship captains and managers of great 
corporations are normally superior servants, differing only in the dignity and 
importance of their positions from those working under them.”241 
So if the concept of control is not the best proxy for the employment 
relationship, what provides a better touchstone?  We can look to the Alchian-
Demsetz critique of Coase for some answers.  Alchian and Demsetz took on 
Coase’s notion of control by arguing that employees received market direction 
just as other economic participants did.  Perhaps the direction was more oblique, 
but it came nevertheless.  Instead, Alchian and Demsetz argue that the critical 
purpose behind the firm in the coordination of joint production.  In their model, 
team production is defined as “production in which 1) several types of resources 
are used and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating 
resource.”242  Firms are used when the team method increases productivity, after 
factoring out the costs associated with monitoring and disciplining the team.243 
The critical insight is that employment is defined not by control, but by 
participation—participation in team production.  It is not that employees are 
controlled by the firm that makes them employees.  It is rather that they are part 
of a process of joint production, acting together within one unit. This unit—the 
firm—has cast its lot together to engage in economic activity that would 
otherwise be extremely difficult to tease out into separate contracts.  Because 
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these players are all working together, they are treated as a unit for certain 
purposes.244   The firm is responsible for the actions of its members, and it has 
responsibility to those members vis-à-vis the fruits of its production process. 
This insight is borne out in subsequent theories of the firm.  Both the 
transaction costs model of the firm and the property rights model of the firm focus 
on the assets of the firm, but these assets can include human capital.245  One of the 
primary functions of the firm under these theories is to organize assets such that 
employees continue to work at and invest their human capital in the firm.  Thus, 
the point is to manage employee participation, rather than employee control.  
Similarly, the “power” model of the firm developed by Rajan and Zingales 
revolves around the power of access to critical resources.  Both the critical 
resources and the access provided to them involve the participation of various 
players within the process.246  Finally, knowledge-based theories of the firm look 
to understand how firms manage the production and utilization of knowledge 
within the firm.247  Such processes are best understood within the lens of joint 
production and employee participation. 
Thus, employment is not about the employer’s control over a particular 
worker; control is not necessary or sufficient to the employment relationship.  
Instead, what is needed is placement of the worker within the boundaries of the 
firm.  Such a worker is an employee; one who works outside those boundaries is 
an independent contractor.  Going forward, then, we should look to participation, 
not control, for our touchstone in the legal doctrine of employment. 
 
B. Participation as Doctrine 
 
If the key to our understandings of employment is participation—
participation, that is, in an ongoing economic enterprise as organized into a 
firm—then how do we operationalize this as legal doctrine?  What would a 
“participation” test look like?  As it turns out, much of the doctrine has already 
moved in the direction of participation; it just has not been recognized as such.    
Although the notion of control has dominated the common-law test, most of the 
factors in that test show the degree of participation in the enterprise. Look at these 
other factors in the Restatement (Second) of Agency’s test: 
 
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct 
occupation or business; 
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(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the 
locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the 
employer or by a specialist without supervision; 
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation; 
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the 
instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work for the person doing 
the work; 
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed; 
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job; 
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the 
employer; 
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation 
of master and servant; and 
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.248 
 
These elements, particularly (b), (e), (f), (h), (i), and (j), indicate whether the 
worker at issue is a participant in a continuing enterprise or instead an economic 
actor that works outside of the firm.  They are about firm boundaries.  Employees 
are those within the firm, while independent contractors are without.  
Participation, not control, is the common theme. 
The “participation” standard also synchronizes better with the modern 
movement toward an “entrepreneurial opportunities” test for employee status.  
The entrepreneurial-oriented test seeks to determine whether the employee is 
located within the firm or outside of it.  For example, the Restatement (Third) of 
Employment Law describes employees as those who work in the interests of the 
employer when “the employer’s relationship with the individual effectively 
prevents the individual from rendering the services as part of an independent 
business.” 249    Non-employees, on the other hand, exercise “entrepreneurial 
control over the manner and means by which the services are performed.”250  This 
test may at first seem related to the degree of control exercised by the employer 
over the details of work, since it discusses control over the manner and means of 
performance.  However, the overall test seems designed to capture whether the 
worker is engaged with the firm’s business or rather operating independently of 
the firm.  In other words, is the worker part of the firm or part of an independent 
business?  The D.C. Circuit’s description of its “entrepreneurial opportunities” 
test is even more explicitly firm-oriented: it counsels that the determination of 
employee status should “focus not upon the employer's control of the means and 
manner of the work but instead upon whether the putative independent contractors 
have a significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.”251 
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Participation within a firm should not be confused with formalistic 
determinations such as whether the employee is on the payroll or is categorized as 
an employee by the firm itself.  These labels are obviously useful but do not tell 
the whole story.  After all, some firms will use disingenuous categories with the 
purpose of avoiding the consequences of employment under the law.252  On the 
other hand, a broad definition of participation will engulf a variety of non-
employees, including members of another firm that is engaging in a joint venture 
or even a simple contractual relationship with the “employer” firm.  For example, 
a painting company with its own painter employees is arguably “participating” in 
the economic enterprise of the firm that hires the company.  A critical component 
of the participation standard, however, is that an employee must be participating 
in the ongoing economic enterprise as organized into a firm.  A painter hired to 
work at the firm through an independent company may be doing the same 
painting as an employee hired by the firm itself.  But the first painter is an 
employee of the independent painting firm, while the second is part of the 
ongoing enterprise of the firm itself.  Factors in the common law test such as the 
length of the engagement, the parties named to the contract, the method of 
payment, and the parties’ beliefs about the relationship all point to the differences 
between an employee and an independent contracting party, because they show 
whether the employee is actually an ongoing participant in the enterprise.253  Of 
course, line-drawing problems remain.  In particular, workers who would 
generally be seen as part of the employer’s regular business but have been 
outsourced to a clearly separate firm would pose tough questions about the 
meaning of “participation.”  However, the participation standard would not 
override existing boundaries to include workers who were clearly outside the 
firm, even if the outsourcing were done for purposes of escaping legal 
ramifications of employment.254 
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Looking at the areas of law in which employment plays a role, the concept 
of “participation” arguably does a better job of defining employee status than does 
control.  The doctrine of respondeat superior dictates when a firm is liable for the 
actions of one of its participants.  If control were the touchstone, then liability 
issues would focus on the extent to which the employees’ actions were controlled 
by the firm in carrying out the tortious act.  Instead, courts have generally 
provided broad berth to employee actions in finding that they were taken within 
the scope of employment.  Firms are liable for the actions of their employees not 
because the employees were being controlled, but because the employees were 
part of a joint enterprise, and that enterprise should bear the costs created by its 
participants.  This justification matches up with the standard theoretical defenses 
for respondeat superior, which justify the doctrine based on risk-allocative or 
retributivist theories.255  As argued in the Prosser & Keeton treatise: 
 
A multitude of very ingenious reasons have been offered for 
the vicarious liability of a master: he has a more or less fictitious 
“control” over the behavior of the servant; he has “set the whole 
thing in motion,” and is therefore responsible for what has 
happened; he has selected the servant and trusted him, and so 
should suffer for his wrongs, rather than an innocent stranger who 
has had no opportunity to protect himself; it is a great concession 
that any man should be permitted to employ another at all, and 
there should be a corresponding responsibility as the price to be 
paid for it—or, more frankly and cynically, “In hard fact, the 
reason for the employers' liability is the damages are taken from a 
deep pocket.” None of these reasons is so self-sufficient as to carry 
conviction, although they are all in accord with the general 
common law notion that one who is in a position to exercise some 
general control over the situation must exercise it or bear the loss . 
. . . 
 
What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious 
liability is a rule of policy, a deliberate allocation of a risk. The 
losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a practical matter 
are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer's enterprise, are 
placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing 
business. They are placed upon the employer because, having 
engaged in an enterprise, which will on the basis of all past 
experience involve harm to others through the torts of employees, 
and sought to profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent 
injured plaintiff, should bear them; and because he is better able to 
absorb them, and to distribute them, through prices, rates or 
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liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to 
the community at large.256 
 
In other words, because the firm is the locus of joint production, and the employee 
is engaged in that joint production, the firm should bear the risk.257  A similar 
theory applies to criminal enterprise liability: the firm is blamed if one of its 
participating employees engaged in the criminal activity within the scope of 
employment and with the intent to benefit the firm.  It does not matter whether the 
employee was “controlled” by the firm in his or her criminal activity; it only 
matters that the employee was participating in the work of the firm when 
committing the crime. 
The role of employment in intellectual property doctrine also accords 
more closely to a participation theory than a control theory.  Under the work-for-
hire doctrine, the employee marks the boundaries of the firm; works made by 
employees within the scope of their employment are considered property of the 
firm, while works made by independent contractors are not (by default).  Under 
the shop-right doctrine, employers enjoy a non-exclusive right to use a patent 
created by an employee without having to compensate the employee.  A shop 
right arises when the employee has created the invention on the job using the 
employer’s materials. 258   Once again, the firm provides the context: if the 
employee creates the invention at work while using the employer’s tools, the 
employer has a right to use that invention without cost.  Because the employee 
has been engaged in the process of joint production, under circumstances where it 
may be difficult to separate out each individual contributor’s contributions, the 
employee has (impliedly) agreed that their joint property belongs to the firm.  It is 
their participation within the firm—not their control by the firm—that justifies the 
transfer of property rights from individual to group. 
 The participation approach matches up with other recent scholarship 
considering IP rights from the perspective of the theory of the firm.259   This 
scholarship uses both the transaction-costs model and the property-rights model in 
demonstrating the connections between intellectual property, employees, and the 
firm.  Using the transaction-costs model, Robert Merges points to the concern 
about employee opportunism and holdups to explain why employers generally 
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hold intellectual property rights over employee inventions. 260   Comparing a 
system of registered patents to a system based solely on trade secret protection, 
Paul Heald argues that patent law makes it easier to buy and sell the information 
at issue.  The patent buyer need not enter into a costly array of contractual 
protections in order to keep others (especially the sellers) from using the 
information and thereby saves on transaction costs.261  He also argues that patent 
facilitates the creation of technical information and the use of that information in 
team production.  Patents enable the critical information to be used within the 
team without fear that one of the team members will defect.  The alternative 
would again be costly contracts with all employees in the team.262  Without the 
need to monitor these contracts, the firm can facilitate team production more 
efficiently.263 
The property-rights theory of the firm explicitly alludes to the importance 
of intellectual property.  In describing the theory, Oliver Hart uses forms of 
intellectual property as examples of the “glue” that binds employees to the 
firm.264  The protections for this type of property are designed to manage not only 
the interactions between firms, but also between the firm and its employees.  Dan 
Burk and Brett McDonnell similarly highlight the way that intellectual property 
rights balance property interests between firms as well as within firms. 265  
Employees have an interest in exploiting information they have created on the 
job, both within the firm and outside the firm when on the job market.266 Patent, 
copyright, and trade secrets each balance the firm’s needs and the individual 
employee’s needs in separating employee information “assets” from firm assets.  
Burk and McDonnell point out that this division mirrors that of agency law and 
the corporate opportunity doctrine, in that the critical factors are whether the 
information/opportunity arose in the context of employment with the use of firm 
resources. 267   Moreover, they point out that the weakest form of intellectual 
property protection – trade secrets protection – applies to the type of information 
most likely to overlap with an employee’s own information capital. 268  This 
balancing of rights within firms and between firms leads to their “Goldilocks” 
hypothesis: the level of legal protection of intellectual property rights that 
minimizes transaction costs will be somewhere between a system that provides 
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strong rights to firms and a system of weak rights for firms. 269  And this 
calibration of legal rights is necessary to balance individual participation with 
group production; the degree of control over the participants is largely irrelevant. 
Finally, the participation theory of employment has explanatory power in areas of 
labor and employment law.  The ability of the firm’s supervisory authorities to 
control the minute details of work, as opposed to the overall scope of a project, 
does not explain why employees should be singled out for protection.  An 
employee can still be given largely free reign to create and produce within the 
firm, and an independent contractor’s work can still be closely supervised and 
monitored.  However, the notion that employees are participating in a common 
enterprise explains why that enterprise would have certain obligations to those 
employees within that relationship.270  The firm is not only responsible for the 
effects of the acts of its employees; it is also responsible to those employees as 
well.  Employment laws are designed to enforce upon employers certain types of 
responsibility for their participants.  Within the common boundaries of the firm, 
employers have an obligation to pay for minimum wage and overtime; provide 
family and medical leave; avoid discrimination; bargain with collective 
representatives; adhere to certain requirements as to retirement and health care 
benefits; and provide insurance in case of unemployment.  Employers have the 
responsibility to provide these things because employees are participants in the 
employers’ common enterprise.271  Team production justifies obligations from the 
team to the individual members.272 
At the same time, participation theory might help us articulate why our 
definition of “employee” seems too crabbed or limiting when it comes to certain 
types of labor and employment protections. For example, employers at the fringes 
of the labor market have used the structure of the firm to regulate their exposure 
to wage and hour protections.273  Because the FLSA uses a definition of “employ” 
that includes “to suffer or permit to work,”274 courts have expanded its definition 
of “employee” to include workers with some degree of independence from a 
traditional firm relationship.  This exception to the general dominance of the 
“control” test may signal that different definitions of employment are 
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appropriate—or one could argue instead that certain wage and hour violations 
should protect workers beyond the employment relationship.  Other countries 
have taken the approach of expanding such protections to include so-called 
“dependent contractors,” who may have independence from the firm but not true 
independence from the economic relationship. 275   Rather than lumping these 
dependent contractors into the employment relationship, it may make more sense 
to recognize that wage and hour protections should run to contractual as well as 
firm relationships.276  Similarly, protections against discrimination are arguably 
justifiable for employees as well as partners, although Title VII only applies to the 
former.  Labor and employment laws provide a diversity of regulatory schemes, 
and there may be good reasons to extend some of those schemes beyond the 
common definition of employment.277  However, it is important to first establish a 
common notion of employment, in order to give meaning to the category beyond 
a chameleon-esque placeholder.  Participation theory provides the best common 
definition for the category. 
In addition, participation explains why employees themselves have a duty 
to the firm.  The fiduciary obligations of corporate directors are well-established: 
directors owe duties of loyalty, care, and good faith in the exercise of their 
responsibilities.  Delaware recently extended these obligations to corporate 
officers as well.278  However, the common law has long maintained that even 
lower-level employees owe fiduciary obligations to their employer. 279   These 
obligations are explored in the Restatement Third of Employment Law, which 
provides that “[e]mployees owe a duty of loyalty to their employer in matters 
related to the employment relationship.”280  Employees breach the duty of loyalty 
by disclosing or using the employer's confidential information, competing with 
the employer, or appropriating the property of the employer or engaging in self-
dealing.281  Under a control theory of employment, these obligations do not really 
make any sense—why should those who are more controlled by the firm have an 
obligation of loyalty to the firm?  But the participation theory nicely explains why 
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individual firm members would owe duties to the ongoing enterprise of which 
they are a part.282 
Admittedly, participation theory does not solve a number of extant issues 
with the definitions of employee and employment.  It does not explain why some 
participants in a common enterprise—family members, for example, or 
prisoners—are not considered to be employees despite their compensated labor.283  
It also does not differentiate between employees who are simply employees and 
those who are labeled as supervisors, managers, or officers and thus are excluded 
from the definition of “employee” for certain purposes.284  “Control” is sometimes 
used as a distinguishing factor in this context: those who are controlled by the 
firm are employees, while those who control the firm (and/or their coworkers) are 
not.285  But employees from the bottom to the top of the firm’s hierarchy are all 
participants in the ongoing economic enterprise; those who have more power 
within the firm may, in fact, be even more closely associated with it.  The purpose 
of the participation standard for employment is to distinguish between employees 
and independent contractors—between those who are inside and outside of the 
firm.  It does not distinguish between employees as to their roles within the firm; 
it does not say which employees can be considered the “employer” for purposes 
of certain labor and employment law regimes.  In those cases, control may be a 
more appropriate guide.286  However, the fact that courts have used the control 
test to distinguish both between employees and independent contractors, as well 
as between employees and employers, provides some indication of the inherent 
incoherence of the test as currently constituted. 
Control is not necessary in finding a worker to be part of an organization.  
Although commentators such as Guy Davidov have included the notion of being 
controlled as critical to the concept of employment,287 such a requirement (in my 
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view) is unnecessary and limiting.  An employee remains an employee whether in 
an extremely hierarchical workplace or in a more collaborative and democratic 
environment.288  In fact, the notion that employees must be controlled—must be 
deprived of power within the firm—has perhaps been a self-fulfilling prophecy.289  
Viewing employees as participants rather than pawns will not only accord better 
with the economic reality of the modern workplace,290 but will also send a signal 
about the proper role of employees within the organization. 
 
 
V. THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE LAW 
 
The preceding discussion assumes the continuing vitality of the concept of 
employment within the law.  However, both the employment relationship and the 
firm itself—at least, in its most common legal persona of the corporation—have 
questionable long-term prospects.  The corporation is under siege by a plethora of 
new organizational structures, most notably the limited liability company (LLC).  
When the Treasury moved to “check-the-box” taxation for these new entities, they 
became viable alternatives to the corporation in a variety of different fields.291  
The flexibility of the LLC form is in contrast to many of the requirements, state 
and federal, placed upon the corporation.292   It seems, perhaps, as if Jensen & 
Meckling’s “nexus of contracts” model is coming to life in the LLC, and the 
corporation’s failure to live up to their model is bringing it down. 
The employment relation is moving from firm to market as well.  In the 
mid-twentieth century, labor economists identified internal labor markets as a 
deviation from neoclassical labor market theory.293  These economists found that 
employees largely stayed within one firm for their lifetime of employment, and 
that firms generally used internal promotion to fill vacancies.  These findings 
established an empirical basis for Coase’s notion of the importance of the 
employment relation to the firm.  Moreover, internal labor markets are an 
instantiation of the separateness of the firm from the market; they demonstrate 
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that the firm is truly a different set of relationships.  However, economists are 
finding that the importance of internal labor markets has been dwindling.   
Beginning in the 1970s, firms began to hire more temporary and contingent 
workers. 294   This trend accelerated through the 1990s, and continues apace.  
Recent reports indicate that the 2008 recession has turned many employees into 
“permanent” temporary workers, with as much as 26 percent of the workforce 
now having “nonstandard” jobs.295  And the effects go beyond low-skill and low-
wage employment; executive officers, lawyers, and scientists are all among the 
temporarily employed.296  Moreover, “outsourcing” – a word of relatively recent 
vintage – continues to break down relationships that were traditionally within the 
firm.297  What Alan Hyde said in 1998 continues to be true today: “Increasingly, 
labor is hired through short-term, market-mediated arrangements that may not be 
‘employment’ relations in any legal or technical sense of that word.”298 
If the corporation is giving way to a more contractually-oriented form of 
business enterprise, and the employment relationship is dissolving back into the 
market, then perhaps corporations (or their successor organizational forms) will 
exist only to structure financial relationships and confer limited liability.  There is 
reason to believe, however, that the firm and the corporation will remain relevant 
to our economic system.  From the organizational perspective, the role of the 
“uncorporation” remains limited under current law.299  It seems likely that not 
only will the public corporation survive, but it will be made even less contractual 
after the passage of finance reform legislation.300  And in the employment context, 
the flight from employment seems driven by an effort to avoid employment-
related regulations and restrictions, rather than the disappearance of the firm 
itself.  In fact, many employers are looking to tie their employees even more 
closely to the firm and its image.  The importance of “brand” for businesses 
means that employees are critical to reifying and promoting the brand, especially 
in service industries.  Firms have used branding to draw out psychological 
commitments from employees that are not reciprocal on the part of the 
employer.301  Participation by enthusiastic employees is becoming more important 
to the role of the firm, not less. 
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In fact, it may be that the tide is turning back to a more employee-oriented 
workplace.  Popular management literature emphasizes the importance of the 
employee.302   Small startups, particularly in the tech industry, are once again 
blurring the line between entrepreneur and employee.303  Academia is evolving, as 
well.  As discussed earlier, recent research into the theory of the firm has focused 
on the importance of knowledge-based assets and the distribution of access top 
those assets within the firm.304  As we learn more about the importance of trust, 
norms, and procedural justice within the corporation, employees will grow even 
more in importance.305 
It is possible to envision a radically individualized future, in which each 
worker is a “corporation” unto herself and firms are merely temporary 
agglomerations within the global market.  It is also possible to envision a future in 
which employees participate at the highest levels of governance, and corporations 
are tools of team production rather than investor enrichment.  Perhaps both of 
these futures are in store, to varying degrees within different industries.  Further 
exploration into the role of the firm will enable us to better understand these 
changes and manage them efficiently through the legal system. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To better understand the meaning of employment, we need to look to the 
organizational structures that create the employment relationship.  We recognize a 
category of “employees” because we recognize the employers that harness their 
collective labor in pursuit of a common economic enterprise.  By looking to the 
literature on the theory of the firm, we can better understand the importance of 
“employment” as an economic and legal concept, and we can better define that 
role to meet the definitional needs of various doctrines.  At this point in our 
history, it makes sense to consider an employee to be one who participates in joint 
production within the context of a firm, rather than one who is controlled by an 
employer.  Such a conception of employment as participation will enable us to 
better understand the reasons why we have a common conception of employment 
that ribbons throughout our law.  Because employees participate within a firm, 
they are responsible to the firm, and the firm is responsible both to and for them. 
We currently are a nation largely of employees.  But that could change.  In 
the end, it will be our approach to the concept of firms that will dictate whether 
the employment relationship—as defined in law—is a historical anachronism or a 
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basis for continued common production.  By better understanding the nature of 
employment, and better framing it as a legal concept, we can understand its 
strengths and limitations as a legal tool, and employ that tool properly in the 
future. 
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